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Notes 
TITLE IX:  CREATING UNEQUAL EQUALITY 
THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE 
PROPORTIONALITY STANDARD IN 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Aaron Roberts is a three-sport high school senior in Smalltown, 
Indiana.1  As he looks for a university to attend next year, he wants to 
find a school that not only offers his favorite sport, hockey, but one that 
may also be able to give him a scholarship to play.  Unfortunately, many 
of the top schools in the area, such as Indiana University and Purdue, do 
not offer a men’s hockey program.  Finally, Aaron finds a small Division 
III school that offers a hockey team, and he is excited to spend the next 
four years of his college career playing hockey for Petite University 
(“PU”).  PU has been competitive in its conference for many years, 
winning the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Division 
III tournament on several occasions.  When Aaron gets to campus, he 
joins the team and has a great first season.  The team wins its conference 
and makes an appearance in the NCAA tournament.  However, after 
Aaron’s freshman season, the school decides to cut the men’s hockey 
program at PU to comply with Title IX.  He must spend the next three 
years playing club hockey instead of enjoying the varsity experience he 
anticipated.2 
Aaron’s story is not uncommon for men’s low-revenue athletic teams 
throughout the country.  In the last twenty years, more than eight 
hundred men’s athletic teams have been eliminated from collegiate 
programs.3  With universities receiving fewer private donations and 
operating budgets being downsized, athletic programs are under more 
                                                 
1 The author created fictional story to illustrate the adverse effects of Title IX’s current 
application to men’s athletic teams, which is the issue of this Note. 
2 If Aaron decides to transfer schools once the program is cut, he will most likely have 
to sit out a year from participating, which can cause problems for the academic transfer of 
credits and eligibility.  See NCAA, TRANSFER 101:  BASIC INFORMATION YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT TRANSFERRING TO AN NCAA COLLEGE (2011), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/TGONLINE2011.pdf (stating that 
eligibility after transfer may be postponed unless an exception is allowed by the new 
school, and exceptions are laid out based on the division of the old and new school). 
3 Ryan T. Smith, Note, “Bull’s Eye”:  How Public Universities in West Virginia Can 
Creatively Comply with Title IX Without the Targeted Elimination of Men’s Sports Teams, 110 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2008). 
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pressure than ever to cut costs.4  Men’s athletic teams often take the 
brunt of these cuts to allow schools to comply with the Title IX 
proportionality requirement, which requires schools to structure athletic 
programs based on the proportion of students who attend the 
university.5  Although Title IX has made large strides in creating 
opportunities for women in athletics, in the forty years since its 
inception, the proportionality requirement of compliance has now 
started creating excessive adverse effects for men’s teams.6  Due to its 
dramatic effect on all aspects of education, especially athletics, scholars 
have analyzed Title IX’s application and interpretation to determine the 
validity and effectiveness of the statute since its enactment in 1972.7 
                                                 
4 See infra notes 41, 56 and accompanying text (discussing the current trend of cuts in 
men’s athletics and the cost efficiency of using cuts to save money within the department). 
5 See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX statutory language and 
the regulations set forth to assess compliance). 
6 See infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing how the proportionality 
requirement has led to a trend of cutting men’s athletic teams to comply with Title IX); see 
also Part II.C.2 (highlighting cases brought under Title IX by members of men’s athletic 
teams due to the discrimination of the Title IX proportionality requirement). 
7 See generally Eric Bentley, Title IX:  The Technical Knockout for Men’s Non-Revenue Sports, 
33 J.L. & EDUC. 139 (2004) (evaluating Title IX and its effect on intercollegiate athletics, 
specifically on men’s non-revenue sports teams); Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical 
Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2006) 
(discussing Title IX’s history and the three-prong test, focusing on the model survey to 
assess prong three); Matthew L. Daniel, Title IX and Gender Equity in College Athletics:  How 
Honesty Might Avert a Crisis, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 255 (1995) (analyzing how Title IX 
affects gender equity in athletics); Suzanne Eckes, Commentary, Another Pin for Women:  
The National Wrestling Coaches Associations’ Title IX Case is Dismissed, 182 ED. LAW. REP. 683 
(2004) (discussing the court’s ruling in a lawsuit filed by the National Wrestling Coaches 
Association alleging Title IX violations for elimination of teams); Elisa Hatlevig, Title IX 
Compliance:  Looking Past the Proportionality Prong, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 87 (2005) (evaluating 
Title IX compliance and noting that the proportionality standard may not be the most 
equitable); Daniel R. Marburger & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Is Title IX Really to Blame for the 
Decline in Intercollegiate Men’s Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 65 (2003) 
(analyzing the economic effects of athletic departments and the effects on Title IX 
compliance); J. Brad Reich, All the [Athletes] Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal than Others:  
An Objective Evaluation of Title IX’s Past, Present, and Recommendations for Its Future, 108 
PENN ST. L. REV. 525 (2003) (evaluating the evolution of Title IX and presenting possibilities 
to clarify the compliance standards to reduce confusion and create alternative ways for 
institutions to comply with Title IX); Armand B. Alacbay, Note, Are Intercollegiate Sports 
Programs a Buck Short?  Examining the Latest Attack on Title IX, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 
255 (2004) (examining the history of Title IX and discussing the effect Title IX has on athletic 
programs); Elizabeth A. Hueben, Note, Revolution, Numbers, IX:  The Thirtieth Anniversary of 
Title IX and the Proportionality Challenge, 71 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 659 (2003) (discussing 
evolution of Title IX and challenges presented by the proportionality requirement of 
compliance standards); Ross A. Jurewitz, Note, Playing at Even Strength:  Reforming Title IX 
Enforcement in Intercollegiate Athletics, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283 (2000) 
(discussing the adverse effects of Title IX on men’s athletic teams); David Klinker, 
Comment, Why Conforming With Title IX Hurts Men’s Collegiate Sports, 13 SETON HALL J. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/8
2012] Unequal Equality 559 
This Note will discuss Title IX’s effect on men’s athletic teams and 
how its proportionality requirement is no longer the best way for 
universities to comply with the statute.  Part II will review the history of 
the Civil Rights Act and the inception of Title IX.8  It will also discuss 
landmark Title IX cases and the courts’ rulings and rationale of these 
cases.9  Further, Part II will highlight a new wave of cases that are 
popping up all over the country—reverse discrimination actions brought 
by men’s athletic teams that have been eliminated.10  Part III of this Note 
will analyze Title IX’s effect on institutions, and discuss how Title IX has 
come full-circle and now discriminates against men solely due to their 
gender.11  Part III will also analyze the problems the proportionality 
prong creates and the benefits of focusing on interest when assessing 
equality of offerings within athletic departments.12  Finally, Part IV will 
propose a new standard of compliance for universities that would 
amend the proportionality requirement to allow schools to focus on 
providing opportunities for all students based on genuine interest and 
desirability of the program.13 
                                                                                                             
SPORT L. 73 (2003) (discussing the history and interpretation of Title IX and examining 
whether the proportionality requirement is consistent with the purpose of Title IX); 
Christopher Paul Reuscher, Comment, Giving the Bat Back to Casey:  Suggestions to Reform 
Title IX’s Inequitable Application to Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 AKRON L. REV. 117 (2001) 
(analyzing Title IX and the adverse effects of its application in college athletics); Ronnie 
Wade Robertson, Comment, Tilting at Windmills:  The Relationship Between Men’s Non-
Revenue Sports and Women’s Sports, 76 MISS. L.J. 297 (2006) (analyzing the compliance 
requirements under Title IX while focusing on the problems created by the proportionality 
standard); Smith, supra note 3 (discussing the history and evolution of Title IX and focusing 
on options for schools in West Virginia to comply with Title IX without cutting teams); 
Megan K. Starace, Comment, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX:  Do Men Have a Sporting 
Chance?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189 (2001) (examining Title IX’s history and claims 
under the statute). 
8 See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the background of the Civil Rights Act, generally, 
and Title IX, specifically, as well as the evolution and application of Title IX). 
9 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing influential cases under Title IX, which have shaped the 
law’s current application). 
10 See infra Part II.C.2 (highlighting recent cases brought by men’s athletic teams 
claiming reverse discrimination under Title IX). 
11 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the shortcomings of Title IX’s current application). 
12 See infra Parts III.B–C (evaluating problems, benefits, and proposed solutions to the 
proportionality prong and the fully and effectively accommodated prong of the compliance 
requirements). 
13 See infra Part IV (proposing new compliance standards and evaluation criteria for 
assessing overall interest in sports to assist universities in determining which sports to 
offer). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
The purpose of Title IX is to prevent discrimination based on sex in 
educational institutions.14  This Part discusses Title IX from its enactment 
to its current state.15  Part II.A discusses the history of Title IX, from its 
enactment in 1972 to the latest policy interpretation in 2010.16  The 
evolution of Title IX and how it has been applied to cases is discussed in 
Part II.B.17  Finally, this Part discusses landmark cases that have been 
decided under Title IX in Part II.C.18  The discussion starts with 
traditional Title IX cases brought by female student-athletes and 
concludes with cases brought by male student-athletes claiming reverse 
discrimination under Title IX.19 
A. History of Title IX 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prohibit discrimination 
and provide “full and equal enjoyment” to “any place of public 
accommodation” regardless “of race, color, religion, or national origin.”20  
Title IX, enacted in 1972 as part of the Educational Amendments, is an 
extension of this Act that prohibits discrimination based on sex in 
educational programs receiving federal funding.21  Title IX expressly 
applies to all “public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school[s], or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher 
education.”22  Although the statute applies to all aspects and levels of 
                                                 
14 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 96-459, at 35 (1979), reprinted in 1979 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1612, 1614 (stating that the purpose for the Educational Amendments is to 
promote the general welfare of the United States, and more specifically to prohibit 
educational institutions from giving preferential or different treatment to members of one 
sex when a “historic disparity” has been shown); S. REP. NO. 96-49, at 11 (1979), reprinted in 
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1514, 1525 (noting that the need for equal access to educational activities 
is paramount, and Title IX is specifically designed to help end sex discrimination). 
15 See infra Parts II.A–C (discussing the history and evolution of Title IX, as well as 
current cases under the statute). 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of Title IX). 
17 See infra Part II.B (examining the evolution of Title IX). 
18 See infra Part II.C (highlighting landmark cases under Title IX). 
19 See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing traditional Title IX cases brought under the statute, 
as well as reverse discrimination cases brought under Title IX). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevi.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) 
(stating that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, or national origin). 
21 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).  “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance . . . .”  Id. 
22 Id. § 1681(c). 
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education, its effect is most recognizable in college athletics.23  Title IX 
requires, aside from proportional opportunities, that men’s and women’s 
athletic programs be relatively equal in categories such as travel, 
equipment, and tutoring.24 
When Title IX was first implemented, there was some confusion as to 
how it should apply to college athletics.25  More specifically, confusion 
arose as to whether Title IX applied to entire institutions or only to the 
specific programs that received federal funding.26  Congress answered 
this question by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which 
expressly stated that Title IX applies to all areas of an educational 
institution that receive federal funding.27  Due to continued confusion, 
however, Congress directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (“HEW”) to create regulations explaining Title IX standards and 
requirements.28  The purpose of the regulations was to provide guidance 
to athletic programs and to make it clear that any kind of gender 
discrimination would result in a Title IX violation.29  The Office of Civil 
Rights (“OCR”), under the Department of Education (“ED”), which is 
                                                 
23 See History of Title IX, TITLE IX.INFO (2012), http://www.titleix.info/History/History-
Overview.aspx (stating that most people who have heard of Title IX think it only applies to 
athletics).  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (discussing prohibition of discrimination in 
educational programs, but never specifically mentioning athletics). 
24 Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1979).  Title IX 
requires schools to provide comparable amenities to both men’s and women’s sports teams 
in such categories as:  (1) equipment and supplies; (2) scheduling of games and practice 
times; (3) travel and per diem allowances; (4) opportunity to receive coaching and 
academic tutoring; and (5) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors.  Id. 
25 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting confusion as to the 
scope of Title IX’s coverage and acceptable avenues of compliance because of an absence of 
legislative materials, lack of committee report, and the fact that intercollegiate athletics was 
only mentioned twice during the congressional debate of the matter); see also Equity in 
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Va. 2009) (noting that 
“‘[a]fter Title IX was passed, there were efforts to limit the effect’” on athletics (quoting 
McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 287 (2d. Cir. 2004))). 
26 Compare Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 329 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that 
a university’s athletic department was not covered by Title IX if it did not receive direct 
federal funding), with Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1982) (ruling that an 
intercollegiate athletic program was subject to Title IX if the university as a whole received 
federal funding). 
27 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).  Title IX 
applies to all of the operations of an educational institution, any part of which is extended 
federal financial assistance.  Id. 
28 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (explaining regulatory framework of Title IX as issued by 
HEW). 
29 See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1979) 
(outlining compliance criteria and policy reasons for the Title IX regulations and the Policy 
Interpretation, which include assessing the equivalence of general athletic program 
components between genders). 
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responsible for the implementation and enforcement of Title IX, 
emphasized the necessity for equal opportunities within intercollegiate 
athletics for all athletes, regardless of gender.30 
In the three years following this initial explanation of the statute, the 
ED received over one hundred discrimination complaints involving 
more than fifty schools.31  In 1979, the OCR issued a “Policy 
Interpretation” that offered a more detailed measure of equal athletic 
opportunity as well as clearer guidelines for schools to follow.32  The 
Policy Interpretation outlined how schools could effectively 
accommodate the interests and abilities of male and female athletes.33  
The OCR provided a three-prong test for schools to utilize in evaluating 
Title IX compliance, which can be satisfied if any one of the following 
prongs is met: 
 (1) Whether intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities for male and female students are provided 
in numbers substantially proportionate to their 
respective enrollments; or 
                                                 
30 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2009).  A recipient of federal funding that operates or sponsors 
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics is required to provide equal athletic 
opportunities for members of both sexes.  Id.  The OCR evaluates a school’s compliance to 
equal opportunity based on ten non-exclusive factors:  (1) whether the selection of sports 
and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of 
both sexes; (2) the provision of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and 
practices; (4) travel and per diem allowances; (5) opportunity to receive coaching and 
academic tutoring; (6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of 
locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) provision of medical and training 
facilities and services; (9) provision of housing and dining facilities; and (10) publicity.  Id.; 
see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (explaining the split of the HEW into the Department of Health 
and Human Services and the ED, and the Office of Civil Rights’ duties under the ED in 
relation to Title IX compliance). 
31 See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413 (“By the end of July 
1978, the [ED] had received nearly [one hundred] complaints alleging discrimination in 
athletics . . . .”); see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896 (noting that the initial issuance of the 
regulations resulted in numerous complaints against many collegiate institutions). 
32 Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413.  “The . . . Policy 
Interpretation represents the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s 
interpretation of the intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 and its implementing regulation.”  Id. 
33 Id. at 71,418.  To “effectively accommodat[e] the interests and abilities of male and 
female athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity for individuals of each sex 
to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for athletes of each sex to have competitive 
team schedules which equally reflect their abilities.”  Id.; see also Letter from Russlynn Ali, 
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from 
Russlynn Ali], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
20100420.pdf (indicating that procedures should be easy to understand and should be 
distributed to students, coaches, and employees). 
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 (2) Where the members of one sex have been and are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, 
whether the institution can show a history and 
continuing practice of program expansion which is 
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and 
abilities of the members of that sex; or 
 (3) Where the members of one sex are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and 
the institution cannot show a continuing practice of 
program expansion such as that cited above, whether it 
can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of 
the members of that sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated by the present program.34 
Typically, schools comply by conforming with the first prong of the 
test because proportionality of students is the most objective standard 
and the easiest with which to comply.35  Historically, the second prong of 
the test has been hard for universities to satisfy due to the short time in 
which the expansion of programs has been occurring.36  Showing not 
only a history, but also a continuation of expansion in women’s athletics 
                                                 
34 Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.  Determination of 
compliance will be based on: 
a.  Whether the policies of an institution are discriminatory in language 
or effect; or  
b.  Whether disparities of a substantial and unjustified nature in the 
benefits, treatment, services, or opportunities afforded male and 
female athletes exist in the institution’s program as a whole; or  
c.  Whether disparities in individual segments of the program with 
respect to benefits, treatment, services, or opportunities are substantial 
enough in and of themselves to deny equality of athletic opportunity.  
Id. 
35 See H. Clay McEldowney, As Colleges Cut Athletics, Title IX Creates an Injustice to Men, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/08/05/AR2009080503089.html (explaining that “compliance” for universities usually 
“means applying a quota standard . . . [that requires] schools [to] maintain the same ratio of 
men and women on the playing field as in the classroom”); see also Alyssa Benedetto, 
College Athletics Affected by Title IX, THE REV. (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.udreview.com/ 
2.1979/college-athletics-affected-by-title-ix-1.138104 (“Under Title IX, there must be 
proportionality between men’s and women’s teams based on the total enrollment at the 
school.”); Eric McErlain, Where Title IX Went Wrong, SAVING SPORTS (Jan. 23, 2008, 4:45 PM), 
http://savingsports.blogspot.com/2008_01_01_archive.html (discussing problems with 
Title IX’s proportionality requirement and how it has been applied in athletic 
departments). 
36 See MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET AL., SPORTS LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 909 (2d ed. 
2007) (noting that in light of the thirty plus years since Title IX’s enactment, it is difficult for 
a school to show “a history and continuing practice of program expansion for women if the 
school still does not provide proportionally equal opportunities for both sexes”). 
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has proven difficult for many universities.37  Likewise, the third prong of 
the test has been difficult for schools to satisfy.38  Even if a school is 
under the impression that it is providing adequate opportunities, the 
filing of a complaint for a Title IX violation shows that the school has not 
met all the interests of the underrepresented gender.39  Due to the 
difficulties and ambiguity of the second and third prongs, more schools 
are electing to comply with Title IX’s compliance requirements by 
offering athletic opportunities that are substantially proportionate to 
enrollment.40  However, complying with the proportionality standard 
                                                 
37 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(claiming a Title IX violation for cutting the men’s wrestling team instead of creating more 
women’s teams to comply with statute); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 635 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (asserting a Title IX violation for elimination of men’s wrestling and soccer teams 
instead of meeting the proportionality requirement by expanding women’s opportunities); 
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994) (bringing a civil rights action for 
elimination of a men’s swimming program to cut costs and remain competitive, while 
allowing women’s teams to remain without creating new teams); see also McEldowney, 
supra note 35 (stating that teams are being cut across the country to help relieve the 
financial burden athletic programs are facing, instead of creating new opportunities for 
women). 
38 See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (explaining that Title IX 
compliance may be satisfied if an institution can “demonstrate[] that the interests and 
abilities of the members of [the underrepresented] sex have been fully and effectively 
accommodated”); COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905 (noting that although the third 
prong sets a high standard, it is not absolute, as the mere fact that there are some female 
students interested in a sport does not ipso facto require the school to provide a team to 
comply with the third benchmark); Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (determining 
compliance for the third prong depends on all of the following questions:  “1.  Is there [an] 
unmet interest in a particular sport?  2.  Is there sufficient ability to sustain a team in the 
sport?  3.  Is there a reasonable expectation of competition for the team?”). 
39 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (“[A]ny time female students bring a Title 
IX lawsuit . . . it is difficult for a college to defend its lack of proportional opportunities by 
arguing that it has fully accommodated women’s interests and abilities.” (quoting 
Kimberly Yuracko, One for You and One for Me:  Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality 
Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 741 
(2003)). 
40 See Neal, 198 F.3d at 770 (stating that the university had to provide athletics 
opportunities in proportion to the gender composition of the student body); Boulahanis, 198 
F.3d at 641 (ruling that the university’s elimination of men’s soccer and wrestling programs 
helped to achieve Title IX compliance under the proportionality standard); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 
272–73 (holding that even after eliminating the men’s swimming program, men’s 
participation in athletics continued to be more than substantially proportionate to women’s 
participation, such that women’s teams could not be eliminated for fear of violating Title 
IX); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 1993) (granting preliminary injunction 
to reinstate women’s varsity field hockey and gymnastics to meet proportionality 
requirement of Title IX); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting 
preliminary injunction restoring women’s gymnastics and volleyball teams to varsity status 
to comply with Title IX); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (“Most 
commentators simply assume that compliance will, at the end of the day, be measured in 
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has required schools to cut men’s athletic teams more frequently in hard 
economic times because athletic departments are unable to support the 
large number of teams; schools must also keep proportionality in mind 
when making cuts.41 
In 2005, the OCR issued an additional clarification regarding 
application of the third prong of the compliance test.42  It also provided a 
model survey for institutions to measure student interest in participating 
in intercollegiate athletics and included specific guidelines for 
implementation.43  However, the OCR has recently determined that the 
2005 Additional Clarification was inconsistent with the 
nondiscriminatory methods set forth by the Policy Interpretation.44  In 
                                                                                                             
terms of substantial proportionality . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Julia Lamber, 
Intercollegiate Athletics:  The Program Expansion Standard Under Title IX’s Policy Interpretation, 
12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 31, 33 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
41 See Rebecca Leung, The Battle Over Title IX, CBS NEWS:  60 MINUTES (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:37 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/27/60minutes/main560723.shtml 
(noting that male athletes on college campuses are claiming they are losing out to women’s 
athletics due to Title IX, and since there is no money to add women’s teams, schools must 
cut men’s teams to comply with the proportionality requirement); McEldowney, supra note 
35 (indicating that men’s teams often take the brunt of athletic department cuts). 
42 See Office For Civil Rights:  Case Resolution and Investigation Manual, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcrm.html (last updated May 2005) 
(providing further clarification to schools for compliance with option three of the three-part 
test); see also Letter from Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, 
Office for Civil Rights, to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir. of Minn. State High School League 
(Apr. 11, 2000), available at http://66.40.5.5/Content/Articles/Issues/Title-IX/C/~/ 
media/Files/PDFs%20and%20other%20files%20by%20Topic/Issues/Title%20IX/O/Offici
al%20OCR%20letter_Cheerleading.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Nat’l Coordinator of Title 
IX Athletics] (discussing assessment tools as well as factors for determining whether the 
OCR will consider the activity to be a “sport” for Title IX compliance evaluation). 
43 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (indicating that the 2005 clarification 
“included a prototype survey instrument (model survey) that institutions could use to 
measure student interest”).  The new clarification states that: 
[S]chools in which females are underrepresented in athletics . . . and 
that have not demonstrated a history and continuing practice of 
expanding opportunities for [women] would be deemed in compliance 
with the law under [p]rong [three] of the athletic participation 
provision if they simply e-mailed a ‘model survey’ to current students 
to determine their interests and abilities and found interest by the 
underrepresented sex to be lacking. 
Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Department of Education Creates Huge Title IX Compliance Loophole:  
The Foundation Position, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND. (June 16, 2005), http://66.40.5.5/ 
Content/Articles/Issues/Title-IX/D/Department-of-Education-Creates-Huge-Title-IX-
Compliance-Loophole-The-Foundation-Position.aspx. 
44 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (“[T]he 2005 Additional Clarification and 
the User’s Guide . . . do not provide the appropriate and necessary clarity regarding 
nondiscriminatory assessment methods, including surveys, under Part Three.”); see also 
Hogshead-Makar, supra note 43 (stating that the 2005 clarification may lead to more 
discrimination against women in athletics by creating a loophole for universities). 
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April 2010, the ED withdrew the 2005 Additional Clarification including 
the Model Survey.45  The assistant secretary of the ED stated that due to 
current resource limitations and their effects on athletic departments, 
there is a need to develop assessment measures that are consistent with 
the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX, while still allowing 
institutions the flexibility to meet their unique circumstances.46 
Under the 2010 “Dear Colleague Letter” from the ED, the “OCR 
recommend[ed] that institutions have effective ongoing procedures for 
collecting, maintaining, and analyzing information on the interests and 
abilities of students of the underrepresented sex.”47  Surveys may be an 
effective way to determine and measure the interest and abilities of the 
students enrolled in a university.48  If an institution utilizes a survey to 
assess the interest of its students, the content, implementation, and 
response rates are considered when determining effectiveness.49  This 
newest clarification from the ED allows schools to assess the interest of 
students in determining Title IX compliance; it therefore provides 
schools with an alternative to the substantial proportionality test.50  Since 
its enactment, almost forty years ago, Title IX has evolved, has been 
officially clarified, and has been applied by courts, schools, and officials 
in a variety of ways resulting in its current application in which 
                                                 
45 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (“All other Department policies . . . remain 
in effect and provide the applicable standards for evaluating Part Three.”). 
46 Id.  The Dear Colleague letter reaffirmed and provided additional clarification on the 
multiple indicators used in assessment of Title IX compliance to ensure institutions’ 
flexibility in developing their own assessment methods.  Id. 
47 See id. (indicating that procedures should include easy-to-understand policies “for 
receiving and responding to requests for additional teams, and wide dissemination of such 
policies . . . to existing and newly admitted students, as well as to coaches and other 
employees”); see also Michelle Brutlag Hosick, OCR Rescinds 2005 Title IX Clarification, 
NCAA NEWS (Apr. 20, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/Misc_Committees_DB/ 
CWA10/May/Supplement%20No.%2030.pdf (stating that NCAA President, Jim Ische, was 
optimistic about the new clarification and its potential effect on Title IX compliance). 
48 Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33.  A well designed survey is one tool that may 
be used to assist an institution in assessing information on students’ interests; the OCR 
evaluates a survey as one component of the institution’s overall assessment under part 
three and will not rely on a survey alone.  Id. 
49 Id.  Although the OCR has not endorsed a specific survey that institutions must use, it 
will evaluate the overall weight of the survey based on the following, non-exclusive 
criteria:  “content of the survey; target population surveyed; response rates and treatment 
of non-responses; confidentiality protections; and frequency of conducting the survey.”  Id. 
50 See id. (explaining that the clarification allows institutions flexibility over their athletic 
programs, but they must remain consistent with the nondiscriminatory Title IX 
requirements). 
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institutions rely heavily on the proportionality standard to comply with 
the statute.51 
B. The Evolution of Title IX 
When Title IX was enacted in 1972, women’s participation in sports 
was minimal, at best.52  In the first four years of its implementation, 
participation in women’s athletics increased by six hundred percent to 
include nearly two million participants.53  In 2008, 3.1 million girls 
participated in high school athletics with an additional 182,503 women 
participating in NCAA collegiate sports.54  After the implementation of 
Title IX, colleges and universities across the country continued to expand 
athletic opportunities for women.55  However, expanding programs is 
becoming increasingly difficult due to the hard economic times.56  
Schools are unable to continuously provide additional opportunities for 
women and must now find alternative ways to meet the Title IX 
compliance requirements.57 
                                                 
51 See infra Part II.B (explaining the evolution and application of Title IX since its 
inception in 1972). 
52 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN SPORTS TIMELINE, http://www.northnet.org/stlawrenceaauw/ 
timelne4.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).  “When President Nixon sign[ed] the act on July 23 
about 31,000 women [were] involved in college sports; spending on athletic scholarships 
for women [was] less than $100,000; and the average number of women's teams at a college 
[was] 2.1.”  Id.  “There [were] 817,073 girls participating in high school sports.”  Id. 
53 Starace, supra note 7, at 189. 
54 U.S. Census Bureau, Women’s History Month:  March 2011, NEWSROOM, 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_edition
s/cb11-ff04.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2012). 
55 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (referencing the 
improvements within Brown University to expand the athletic opportunities for women 
after Title IX’s passage); see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (discussing growth of Colorado State University’s athletic program in the 1970s); 
DENISE DEHASS, 2005–06 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT 9 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/GER06.pdf (noting that by the 
2005–2006 academic year, women’s participation in college athletics had risen from forty-
two to fifty percent of total athletes). 
56 See Brody Schmidt, College Sports Try to Fend Off Economic Blitz, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 
2008, 7:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2008-11-14-college-economy_N.htm 
(noting that regardless of the size of the school, many athletic programs are getting nervous 
about their financial future due to boosters and other donation sources pulling out in the 
hurting economy); see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (noting that hard economic times make it difficult for schools to expand their 
women’s athletic programs, and therefore, financially-strapped institutions may still 
comply with Title IX by cutting athletic programs to meet substantial proportionality). 
57 See McEldowney, supra note 35 (stating that men’s teams are often eliminated 
disproportionately to women’s teams and that even when women’s teams are cut alongside 
men’s, the men’s roster spots are reduced in greater numbers); Mark Schlabach, Programs 
Struggle to Balance Budget, ESPN (July 13, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/ 
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As a result of Title IX, women have continued to benefit from the 
creation of new programs and new opportunities to compete at the 
amateur level as well as the professional level through the inception of 
leagues, such as the Women’s National Basketball Association 
(“WNBA”) and Women’s United Soccer Association (“WUSA”).58  
However, there is still evidence that there is more interest in men’s 
athletics and, therefore, higher participation.59  This discrepancy in the 
level of interest has led schools to comply with Title IX by contracting 
and eliminating men’s sports teams.60  Compliance by contraction has 
become a more common practice for athletic departments in recent years 
due to the courts’ interpreting contraction as a valid form of Title IX 
compliance.61 
Over the last forty years, Title IX has gone from providing 
opportunities for women to eliminating opportunities for men, which is 
directly contrary to Title IX’s purpose of creating opportunities regardless 
of sex.62  As men’s athletic teams continue to be cut due to Title IX 
                                                                                                             
columns/story?columnist=schlabach_mark&id=4314195 (discussing that athletic 
departments are struggling to balance the books after receiving less in federal funding as 
well as fewer donations from alumni and boosters, and as a result, schools are resorting to 
cutting programs to try and save money); see also Joe Drape, Cal-Berkeley Cuts 5 Athletic 
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/sports/29cal. 
html (noting that five teams were dropped from the athletics department at the University 
of California, Berkeley to save nearly $4 million per year, and two of the teams dropped, 
“baseball and men’s rugby, had become particular points of pride over the years”). 
58 WILLIAM H. GLOVER, JR., SPORTS LAW HANDBOOK FOR COACHES AND 
ADMINISTRATORS 103 (2009).  Title IX has allowed women athletes to come a long way in 
the participation of athletics.  Id.  Also, the creation of leagues such as the WNBA and the 
WUSA has allowed an increase in opportunities for women to pursue professional athletics 
as a career.  Id. 
59 See Reich, supra note 7, at 569 (noting that desire to participate is often higher in men, 
as the average men’s track team will attract thirty-two members while the corresponding 
female team will attract only twenty-seven). 
60 GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 64; see also id. (noting that men’s athletic teams have 
become the victim of Title IX regarding compliance with the substantial proportionality 
requirement because they have historically been larger and better-funded). 
61 COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913; see also id. (noting that compliance by 
contraction is consistent with 1979 OCR interpretations of Title IX regulations, but draws 
battle lines between men’s and women’s athletic teams).  The court indicates that Title IX 
does not require that a school continue to add money and programs into an athletic 
department; it may also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark 
(proportionality) by subtraction and downgrading of opportunities of the overrepresented 
gender.  Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st. Cir. 1993). 
62 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913 (noting that compliance by contraction 
allows universities to take a passive solution “rather than develop creative ideas to level 
the playing field” for both sexes, therefore “[t]he debate [continues] as to whether this 
approach comports with the letter and spirit of Title IX”); GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 63 
(“Since 1972, 256 colleges have dropped [men’s] wrestling.”); see also supra text 
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compliance, more lawsuits are being filed by athletes and teams for 
reverse discrimination.63  Most, if not all of these cases, have been 
dismissed, and courts have ruled that eliminating men’s athletic teams 
does not constitute a reverse discrimination or equal protection cause of 
action.64  Courts have also ruled that Title IX, itself, is not violated by the 
elimination of men’s athletic teams.65  However, as more and more teams 
are cut to comply with Title IX, people are starting to question whether 
men’s teams should have some recourse in the courts.66 
C. Cases Under Title IX 
Since its inception, Title IX has prompted many lawsuits brought by 
student-athletes who feel that lack of athletic opportunities or the 
elimination of athletic teams violates the statute’s compliance 
requirements.67  Schools must show that they are providing 
                                                                                                             
accompanying note 14 (reiterating that the purpose of Title IX is to prevent gender 
discrimination in educational institutions). 
63 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Title IX cases brought by eliminated men’s athletic 
teams, alleging violations of Title IX compliance requirements). 
64 See, e.g., Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the university’s action did not violate equal protection, and claims against the university 
under § 1983 are preempted by Title IX); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272–73 (7th Cir. 
1994) (ruling that the university’s decision to terminate the men’s swimming program 
while retaining women’s swimming did not violate equal protection); Equity in Athletics, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 680 (W.D. Va. 2009) (ruling that regulation 
implementing Title IX did not violate equal protection rights of overrepresented gender 
members). 
65 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“holding that Title IX does not bar universities from taking steps to ensure that women are 
approximately as well represented in sports programs as they are in student bodies”); 
Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639 (ruling that a university’s elimination of men’s teams based on 
sex discrimination theory did not violate Title IX); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (holding that a 
university’s decision to terminate the men’s swimming program while retaining women’s 
swimming did not violate Title IX); Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (stating 
that a university could choose to pursue gender proportionality in its athletic programs by 
eliminating men’s programs, and therefore Title IX was not violated); see also Cohen, 991 
F.2d at 898 (indicating that Title IX does not require that a school continue to add money 
and programs into an athletic department, as it may bring itself into compliance with the 
first benchmark (proportionality) by subtraction and downgrading of opportunities of the 
overrepresented gender). 
66 McEldowney, supra note 35.  The worsening economy makes gender equity an even 
more impossible hurdle; once a school determines that it must cut programs, Title IX 
controls which teams will be eliminated.  Id.  “[A]s legal action groups and gender activists 
are riding to the rescue of women’s sports, there appears to be no similar savior for men’s 
athletics.  Although the law promises equal protection for both sexes, . . . [officials have] 
been silent on the cuts to men’s [sport] teams.”  Id. 
67 See generally Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 961–62 (9th Cir. 
2010) (presenting a putative class action suit where female wrestlers alleged that their 
exclusion from the wrestling team violated Title IX and equal protection rights); Mercer v. 
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opportunities that fully and effectively address their students’ interests.68  
When athletes feel that the school is not providing opportunities that 
fully and effectively meet their needs, lawsuits are the most common 
response, although they can be time-consuming and very expensive for 
both sides.69  Almost all courts have come to the same conclusion when 
evaluating Title IX compliance:  Suits alleging discrimination against 
women’s athletic teams have resulted in favor of the student-athletes, 
while suits alleging discrimination against men’s athletic teams have 
resulted in favor of the university.70  The cases outlined below, divided 
into “traditional cases” and “reverse discrimination cases,” illustrate the 
courts’ trend when ruling on Title IX compliance cases.71 
1. Traditional Title IX Cases 
The most influential case in Title IX’s history is Cohen v. Brown 
University.72  In Cohen, members of the women’s gymnastics and 
                                                                                                             
Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999) (involving a Title IX action brought by a 
female student-athlete against a university for refusing to allow her to be a member of the 
men’s football team); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 334 (3d. Cir. 1993) (alleging that 
a university discriminated against female athletes on the basis of gender when it cut 
women’s gymnastics and field hockey athletic programs); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of 
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 1993) (involving former members of a women’s varsity 
softball team who brought a Title IX action challenging university’s cancellation of the 
program); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (claiming a Title IX violation when women’s gymnastics 
and volleyball teams were demoted from full varsity status to club status); see also Neal, 198 
F.3d at 765 (alleging a Title IX and equal protection violation by a university for eliminating 
a number of roster spots on the men’s wrestling team); Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 636 
(presenting male athletes who brought claims against a university for violating Title IX and 
discriminating on the basis of sex when it eliminated the men’s soccer and wrestling 
programs); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267 (involving a case where athletes alleged that Title IX was 
violated when the men’s swimming program was cut, but the women’s program was 
retained). 
68 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining Title IX compliance 
requirements); see also supra notes 38 and 39 (discussing specifically the third prong of the 
compliance requirements). 
69 See Jill Lieber Steeg, Lawsuits, Disputes Reflect Continuing Tension Over Title IX, USA 
TODAY, May 13, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-05-12-titleix-
cover_N.htm (noting that two lawsuits for Title IX infractions against Fresno State 
University cost the school and California taxpayers more than $14 million plus interest, 
which continues to accrue through the appellate process). 
70 See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing the holdings of cases under Title IX, noting that 
lawsuits brought by women’s athletic teams require reinstatement of teams, while men’s 
actions are dismissed). 
71 See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing Title IX court cases brought by women claiming 
Title IX violations by universities, and claims by men’s teams alleging reverse 
discrimination in violation of the proportionality compliance requirement). 
72 991 F.2d 888; see Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965 (quoting Cohen in determining that female 
wrestlers had a claim under the fully and effectively accommodated prong of Title IX); 
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volleyball teams filed suit against the university for Title IX violations 
when the teams were eliminated.73  The cuts were made to comply with 
the Title IX substantial proportionality requirement and to cut costs in 
the athletic department.74  In assessing the school’s Title IX compliance, 
the First Circuit stated that a plaintiff must “show disparity between the 
gender composition of the institution’s student body and its athletic 
program, thereby proving that there is an underrepresented gender.”75  
The plaintiff must then show there is unmet interest, which indicates 
“that the underrepresented gender has not been ‘fully and effectively 
accommodated by the present program.’”76  If the plaintiff meets this 
                                                                                                             
Favia, 7 F.3d at 343 (citing Cohen in discussion of the three prong test set forth by the OCR); 
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 87 (D. Conn. 2010) (noting Title IX’s 
history as evaluated in Cohen); see also GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 107 (noting that Cohen 
is often regarded as the most influential case decided under Title IX); Reuscher, supra note 
7, at 131 (stating that Cohen is viewed by many as the landmark case of Title IX). 
73 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.  “The [u]niversity permitted the teams to continue playing as 
‘intercollegiate clubs,’ a status that allowed them to compete against varsity teams from 
other colleges,” but they would no longer have the varsity status.  Id.  Financial support 
from the university would, however, be cut off.  Id.; see also Jennifer R. Capasso, Note, 
Structure Versus Effect:  Revealing the Unconstitutional Operation of Title IX’s Athletics 
Provisions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 825, 834 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs in Cohen represented a class 
of current and future women athletes and challenged Brown University’s decision to drop 
teams to reduce the financial burden in the athletic department). 
74 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.  Brown’s student body consisted of approximately 48% women 
and 52% men, while its athletic program consisted of 37% women and 63% men.  Id.  The 
school stated they would save approximately $78,000 by cutting the four varsity teams 
(men’s golf and water polo were also cut, though not reinstated through this action).  Id.  In 
the 1991–1992 academic year, Brown offered fifteen women’s athletic teams and sixteen 
men’s teams.  Id. 
75 Id. at 901.  The court ruled that a Title IX violation may not be found solely due to a 
disparity between gender composition of the student body and the athletic program.  Id. at 
895.  Statistical evidence of disparity must be accompanied by further evidence of 
discrimination, such as an unmet need in the underrepresented gender.  Id.; see also 
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 864 (stating that even before the cuts to the women’s programs, 
the percentage of female athletes was far less than the percentage of female students 
enrolled at Brown, therefore statistical evidence showed a violation of the first prong); 
Alacbay, supra note 7, at 267 (noting that the court in Cohen ruled that there “is no specific 
ratio that would automatically satisfy substantial proportionality”). 
76 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902 (quoting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The third prong of 
the test sets a high, but not absolute, standard.  Id. at 898.  The school must be diligent in 
ensuring that participatory opportunities in which “there is sufficient interest and ability 
among the members of the excluded sex . . . and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate 
competition” are met.  Id. (quoting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. 
Reg. at 71,418) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The accommodation must be “full-and-
effective,” as some accommodation will not meet the standard under Title IX.  Id.; see also 
Alacbay, supra note 7, at 267 (stating that the purpose of prongs two and three is to make 
Title IX a vehicle by which women would become more interested in sports, and therefore 
the standard is high, but not unattainable); Capasso, supra note 73, at 836 (“The court 
Ambrosius: Title IX: Creating Unequal Equality through Application of the Pr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
572 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
burden, she has proven her case, and the university is in violation of 
Title IX unless it can assert an affirmative defense.77  In Cohen, the First 
Circuit “ruled that a university violates Title IX if it ineffectively 
accommodates student interests and abilities regardless of its 
performance in other Title IX areas.”78 
The Cohen court also held that a school is not required to create 
teams for the underrepresented gender if that sex is demonstrably less 
interested in athletics to comply with Title IX.79  However, the university 
must provide gender-blind equality of athletic opportunity to its student 
body.80  If a university prefers, it may bring itself into compliance with 
                                                                                                             
cautioned, however, that . . . if there is sufficient interest and ability among members of the 
underrepresented sex that existing programs do not satisfy, an institution [will] fail[] the 
third prong of the [compliance] test.”). 
77 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902.  A university may present a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion for the underrepresented gender as an affirmative defense against a 
Title IX action.  Id.  If they cannot show this history and continuation of expansion, the 
institution must remain vigilant in the upgrading of competitive opportunities available to 
the disadvantaged gender.  Id. at 898.  The school should continue “developing abilities 
among the athletes of that sex until the opportunities for, and levels of, competition are 
equivalent by gender.”  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Alacbay, supra note 7, at 268 (“[A]n institution must either prove that it has some program 
in place that anticipates compliance at some specific date in the future, or prove that there 
is not a sufficient unmet interest by an underrepresented gender in a specific sport.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
78 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897.  Even if a school meets the requirements in its allocation of 
“financial assistance” and “athletic equivalence,” Title IX can be violated if the interests 
and abilities of the underrepresented sex are not fully and effectively accommodated.  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 Id. at 898.  Title IX does not require that a school create teams for otherwise 
disinterested students.  Id.  The purpose of the third prong of the three-part test is “to 
determine whether a student has been ‘excluded from participation in, [or] denied the 
benefits of’ an athletic program ‘on the basis of sex.’”  Id. at 899–900 (alteration in original) 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006)); see also Capasso, supra note 73, at 836 (noting that 
although Title IX does not require institutions to provide every athletic opportunity, it does 
require an “institution to establish a new team or upgrade an existing club team if there is a 
sufficiently high unmet need in the underrepresented gender”). 
80 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896.  Brown violated Title IX by not “effectively accommodat[ing] 
the interests and abilities of female students in the selection and level of sports.”  Id.; see also 
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 865 (discussing Brown’s argument that the third prong of 
compliance should be satisfied using a relative interest test, which provides athletic 
opportunities to women based on the ratio of interested and able women to interested and 
able men, and noting that the court rejected this argument as not being gender-blind); 
Capasso, supra note 73, at 836 (noting that the court’s opinion found that the university’s 
interpretation of the third prong “read[s] the full out of the duty” to “fully and effectively” 
accommodate its students on a gender neutral basis (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Reuscher, supra note 7, at 133 (stating that based on common sense and logic, Brown 
argued that the number of women enrolled at the institution was the incorrect standard 
since women and men often do not share an equal interest in sports, but the court 
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the first benchmark of the three-part test by reducing opportunities for 
the overrepresented sex.81  Because Brown University did not meet any 
of the standards in the three-part test, it was in violation of Title IX, and 
therefore the women’s teams were required to be reinstated to full 
varsity status.82 
This case was the first of its kind to determine how Title IX applied 
to women in athletic situations.83  By ruling that universities must 
provide equal opportunities for both genders and that the 
proportionality requirement could be met by subtraction, schools were 
able to comply with Title IX by cutting men’s teams if they were unable 
to add women’s teams.84  The outcome has been relied on by many other 
courts in Title IX actions throughout the years.85 
                                                                                                             
dismissed this argument stating that “no person could continuously keep track and 
summarize ‘students [sic] interests and abilities’”). 
81 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898–99.  The fact that the overrepresented gender is not “fully and 
effectively” accommodated does not excuse the lack of opportunities provided for the 
underrepresented sex.  Id. at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also COZZILLIO ET 
AL., supra note 36, at 913 (noting that compliance by contraction is consistent with the 1979 
OCR interpretations of the Title IX regulations, but draws battle lines between men’s and 
women’s athletic teams, and also acknowledging that compliance by contraction allows 
universities to take a passive solution rather than “develop creative ideas to level the 
playing field” for both sexes). 
82 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907.  Brown did not even closely meet the “substantial 
proportionality” test under prong one.  Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Although Brown could show “impressive growth” in the 1970s, it had not added a 
women’s team in nearly twenty years, and therefore did not meet the second prong of the 
Title IX requirement.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Also, there would be a waste 
of great interest and talent if women’s volleyball and gymnastics were eliminated, 
therefore failing to meet the third prong of the test.  See id. at 904 (recognizing that women’s 
volleyball and gymnastics would have fewer players and become less competitive if given 
club status, rather than varsity status); Capasso, supra note 73, at 837 (noting that the Cohen 
court held that “Title IX [was] not an affirmative action statute, but rather an anti-
discrimination statute, and that no aspect of the Title IX regime mandates gender-based 
preferences or quotas”). 
83 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 891 (noting that this was a “watershed case” in which there was 
some confusion as to Title IX’s application to college athletics); Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 864 
(noting that “by its own description and any objective measure,” Cohen is considered the 
“‘watershed’ decision about equal athletic opportunity”); Capasso, supra note 73, at 834 
(designating the Cohen decision as the “‘[w]atershed’ [i]nterpretation” of Title IX). 
84 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (acknowledging that Title IX does not require a school to 
pour infinite funds into its athletic department to accommodate all needs, as a school may 
comply by downgrading or reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender while 
keeping opportunities for the underrepresented gender stable). 
85 See generally Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Cohen in determining that female wrestlers had a claim under the fully and 
effectively accommodated prong of Title IX); Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (prohibiting the university from discriminating against a student on the basis of 
her sex once it allowed her to try out for the football team); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 
332, 344 (3d. Cir. 1993) (requiring the university to reinstate women’s varsity field hockey 
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The same year Cohen was decided, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that Indiana University of Pennsylvania (“IUP”) had to 
reinstate its women’s field hockey and gymnastics teams to comply with 
Title IX in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania.86  The court affirmed 
the district court’s order, which determined that IUP did not meet any of 
the three prongs of the Title IX compliance test, especially substantial 
proportionality, and therefore could not eliminate women’s teams.87  IUP 
tried to substitute women’s soccer for women’s gymnastics after the 
preliminary injunction was granted, but the court ruled that although 
women’s soccer would increase the proportionality of the athletic 
department, the spending would be much less.88  This case provided that 
unequal aggregate expenditures would be considered in assessing 
equality of opportunities for each sex.89 
Mercer v. Duke University,90 which was decided in 1999, determined 
that where a member of the excluded sex is allowed to try out for a 
                                                                                                             
and gymnastics programs to comply with Title IX); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 62, 87–92 (D. Conn. 2010) (discussing Title IX’s history as evaluated in Cohen). 
86 See Favia, 7 F.3d at 344 (affirming a preliminary injunction granted by the district 
court, which required IUP to reinstate women’s varsity field hockey and gymnastics 
programs); see also Reuscher, supra note 7, at 135–36 (noting that the court entered judgment 
for the plaintiff “and ordered the restoration of the women’s teams back to varsity status”). 
87 Favia, 7 F.3d at 335–36.  The student body of IUP was 56% women and 44% men, while 
athletic participation was 38% women and 62% men.  Id. at 335.  The court ruled that IUP 
had failed to provide equal athletic opportunities to female students and therefore was in 
violation of Title IX.  Id. at 336.  Prior to this action, IUP offered nine men’s and women’s 
varsity athletic teams; however the men’s teams were much larger.  Id. at 335.  Due to the 
disproportionate number of participants, IUP was in violation of Title IX.  Id. at 336. 
88 Id. at 336.  The school already had plans to elevate its women’s club soccer team to 
varsity status, which would increase the percentage of women participating in sports to 
forty-three percent.  Id.  The athletic director also noted that soccer would follow the 
national trend toward women’s participation in soccer and away from gymnastics, and 
would increase recruiting of future athletes.  Id.  The court also noted that replacing 
gymnastics, which requires a $150,000 investment with soccer, which requires only $50,000, 
would decrease the overall expenditures for women’s athletics.  Id. at 343; see also Jill K. 
Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics:  Current Judicial Interpretation of the 
Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 553, 579 (1994) (“Two months after the preliminary 
injunction [was] issued, IUP sought to modify the order by substituting a women’s soccer 
team for the women’s gymnastics team.”); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 311 (discussing IUP’s 
argument for modification of the injunction, stating that it would allow the school to make 
progress in achieving proportionality while increasing recruitment options for the future). 
89 Favia, 7 F.3d at 343.  “[U]nequal aggregate expenditures for members of male and 
female teams will not necessarily establish noncompliance” with Title IX.  Id.  However, the 
“failure to provide funds . . . [to] one sex may be considered in assessing [the] equality of 
opportunit[ies].”  Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 88, at 579–80 (noting that a fifty-member 
soccer team, costing $50,000, would bring the university closer to proportionality 
compliance than a fifteen-member gymnastics team costing $150,000; however, the court 
denied the motion to amend because expenditures would be less for women’s athletics). 
90 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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historically one-gendered sport, the university could not discriminate on 
the basis of sex in allowing the athlete to play on the team.91  Title IX 
provides that a university may provide gender-segregated teams if the 
sport is a contact sport or if selection for the team is based upon 
competitive skill.92  However, where there is no comparable team, 
“members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team 
offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.”93  The court ruled 
that members of the excluded sex need not be allowed to try out for a 
contact sport, but if the institution and team allows them to try-out, the 
athlete may not be discriminated against based on sex.94 
Although these traditional Title IX cases have shaped the 
interpretation of the statute by courts, they are not the only cases 
involving discrimination claims under Title IX.95  Men’s athletic teams 
that have been cut to allow universities to comply with the substantial 
                                                 
91 Id. at 648.  Because Duke allowed Mercer to try out for its football team, and made her 
a member of the team for a period of time, the team was not allowed to discriminate 
against her solely on the basis of sex.  Id.; see also Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker:  Thirty 
Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551, 563 (2003) (“Title IX regulations permit the 
operation of separate sex teams . . . when participation is based on competitive skill or 
when the team competes in a ‘contact’ sport.”). 
92 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2009).  “[An institution] may operate or sponsor separate teams 
for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or 
the activity involved is a contact sport.”  Id.; see also Mercer, 190 F.3d at 646 (noting that 
institutions are allowed “to operate separate teams for men and women in many sports, 
including contact sports such as football, rather than integrating those teams”); Cohen v. 
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that “athletic program[s] may consist 
of gender-segregated teams as long as” the sport is either a contact sport or there is a 
comparable team for each gender). 
93 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). 
94 Mercer, 190 F.3d at 647–48.  The court stated that the text of the clause is incomplete in 
that it states that a member of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out as long as the 
sport is not a contact sport, but it gives no indication of what the requirement is for a 
contact sport.  Id. at 647.  The court read the rule to say “members of the excluded sex must 
be allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport, in 
which case members of the excluded sex need not be allowed to try out.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court concluded by saying that since Duke University allowed Mercer 
to try out for a historically gender-segregated sport, it could not discriminate against her 
after the fact.  Id. at 648; see also Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption:  
Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381, 395 (2000) (noting that the 
Fourth Circuit held “that while Title IX’s contact sports exception would have allowed 
Duke to exclude Mercer from the team despite her abilities, once she was allowed on the 
team, she could not be discriminated against on the basis of her sex”). 
95 See infra Part II.C.2 (presenting other cases involving discrimination claims under Title 
IX); supra Part II.C.1 (highlighting the holdings in traditional Title IX cases). 
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proportionality test have started bringing actions based on Title IX 
infringement and equal protection violations.96 
2. Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX 
Suits brought under Title IX have traditionally involved a challenge 
to a university for violating compliance requirements when the 
university eliminated women’s athletic teams.97  However, the trend is 
changing and more men are alleging violations under Title IX and the 
Equal Protection Clause for cuts to men’s athletic teams.98  The first 
significant reverse discrimination suit was decided in 1994 in Kelley v. 
Board of Trustees.99  In Kelley, members of the men’s swimming program 
at the University of Illinois brought a Title IX and reverse discrimination 
action when the team was eliminated from the athletic department.100  In 
determining the regulations for Title IX, Congress did not require 
schools to have parallel teams for each gender; therefore, cuts to the 
athletic department could be gender-based to meet substantial 
proportionality.101  Congress has the broad power to remedy past 
                                                 
96 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing cases brought by men’s athletic teams who assert that 
cutting men’s teams to comply with Title IX’s proportionality requirement is essentially 
gender discrimination and a Title IX violation). 
97 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Title IX cases brought by women’s athletic teams 
claiming Title IX violations). 
98 See generally Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(presenting a men’s athletic team that claimed that a university’s reducing the number of 
roster spots on its men’s wrestling team violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX); 
Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1999) (asserting that elimination of 
the men’s soccer and wrestling teams at Illinois State University programs violated Title IX 
and sex discrimination under § 1983); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(alleging violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause when the men’s swimming 
program was terminated at the University of Illinois); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (W.D. Va. 2009) (claiming that Title IX regulations, which 
imposed gender equality in federally financed programs and resulted in the elimination of 
athletic teams, were unconstitutional). 
99 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994). 
100 Id. at 267.  The University of Illinois determined it would only field teams that were 
capable of competing for Big Ten Titles and NCAA championships.  Id. at 269.  The school 
selected the swimming program for elimination because of its history of weak performance 
and lack of spectator following.  Id.  The university did not, however, eliminate the 
women’s swimming program for fear of violating Title IX.  Id.  At the time of the lawsuit, 
the University of Illinois’s student body consisted of 44% women and 56% men, while its 
athletic program consisted of 23% women and 67% men.  Id.; see also Capasso, supra note 73, 
at 838 (noting that male swimmers “sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the 
university from cutting their program while leaving the female swimming program 
intact”); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 314 (noting that the court “was sympathetic to the 
unfortunate loss of men’s opportunities from the implementation of Title IX”). 
101 Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271.  The OCR “could have required schools to sponsor a women’s 
program for every men’s program offered and vice versa.”  Id.  This method of ensuring 
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discrimination, thus men cannot claim a Title IX violation for lack of full 
and effective accommodation if the proportionality requirement is still in 
their favor.102  Therefore, the Kelley court ruled that the men’s team did 
not have a valid cause of action under Title IX or the Equal Protection 
Clause.103 
Five years after Kelley was decided, the Seventh Circuit again 
decided a case involving alleged reverse discrimination and a Title IX 
violation when men’s teams were cut from an athletic department in 
Boulahanis v. Board of Regents.104  In Boulahanis, former members of the 
men’s soccer and wrestling teams claimed that the elimination of men’s 
teams denied them “equal athletic opportunity” under Title IX.105  The 
cuts were a response to a Title IX compliance investigation done by the 
                                                                                                             
equality among teams would undoubtedly have been the easiest to comply with, but 
requiring such a rigid approach would deny schools the flexibility to respond to men’s and 
women’s differing interests in athletics.  Id.  The substantial proportionality benchmark 
provides schools with a clear way to establish compliance, and men’s teams may be cut 
based on gender to meet the requirements.  Id.; see also Heckman, supra note 91, at 563 
(noting that Title IX regulations did not require separate, parallel teams for each gender 
and “the operation of separate sex teams . . . when participation is based on competitive 
skill or when the team competes in a ‘contact’ sport” was acceptable). 
102 Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272.  Removing the legacy of sexual discrimination, including 
discrimination in athletics, is an important government objective; therefore, the court must 
give deference to Congress in remedying this discrimination.  Id.  Men’s participation in 
athletics at the university, even after the elimination of the swimming program, was 
proportionately higher than that of their female counterparts.  Id. at 270.  “[I]f the 
percentage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially proportionate to the 
percentage of students of that sex in the general student population, the athletic interests of 
that sex are presumed to have been accommodated.”  Id.; see also Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 
314 (stating that the court held that “the law permits discriminatory remedial measures 
provided that they are substantially related to prohibiting gender discrimination”); 
Reuscher, supra note 7, at 137 (noting that “even though the elimination of the program 
excluded [plaintiffs] from varsity participation as individuals, the percentage of all men 
participating in the varsity program [was] more than substantially proportionate to the 
percentage of men represented by the undergraduate population” and, therefore, Title IX 
was not violated (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
103 Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272–73.  The court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
university.  Id. at 267.  The district court correctly ruled that the University of Illinois did 
not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause in its decision to terminate the men’s 
swimming team.  Id. at 272–73. 
104 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).  The court stated that the plaintiff-appellants’ argument 
was substantially similar to that already considered in Kelley.  Id. at 637. 
105 Id. at 635.  The court stated that unless the judicial system is willing to mandate 
spending by universities to increase opportunities for the underrepresented sex, the OCR’s 
proportionality rule must be read to allow the elimination of men’s athletic teams to 
achieve Title IX compliance.  Id. at 638; see also Catherine Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty:  A 
Review of Recent Developments, 30 J.C. & U.L. 75, 103 (2003) (noting that because of the 
difficulty in distinguishing decisions made solely due to financial reasons from those made 
to comply with Title IX, the Seventh Circuit refused to distinguish Boulahanis from Kelley). 
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Gender Equity Committee, which found the school to be in violation of 
the statute.106  The court ruled that “the elimination of men’s athletic 
programs [was] not a violation of Title IX as long as men’s participation 
in athletics continues to be ‘substantially proportionate’ to their 
enrollment.”107 
The men’s teams argued that if Title IX is interpreted to permit the 
elimination of men’s teams solely on the basis of sex, the Equal 
Protection Clause would be violated.108  However, the court, following 
Kelley, ruled that Title IX’s objective to prohibit discrimination in the 
historically underrepresented gender is accomplished by pursuing 
substantial proportionality.109  Neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated by the elimination of men’s teams to comply with the 
Title IX proportionality requirement.110 
                                                 
106 Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 635.  In the fall of 1993, the Gender Equity Committee of Illinois 
State University began a year-long investigation into Title IX compliance at the school.  Id.  
The committee found that the university’s student body consisted of 45% males and 55% 
females, while the athletic participation was 66% men and 34% women.  Id.  The school had 
not added a women’s athletic team in over ten years and did not believe that it could fully 
and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the female student-body; 
therefore, the school decided to focus on the substantial proportionality requirement.  Id.  
The university began finding ways to comply with Title IX and eventually decided to 
eliminate men’s wrestling and soccer, add women’s soccer, and reduce men’s roster spots 
on other teams.  Id. at 636.  This adjustment changed the athletic participation ratio to 52% 
women and 48% men.  Id.; see also Pieronek, supra note 105, at 103 (“Because [ISU] has 
achieved substantial proportionality between men’s enrollment and men’s participation in 
athletics, it is presumed to have accommodated [men’s] athletic interests.” (alterations in 
original)). 
107 Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638.  The court also noted, as it did in Kelley, that if a university 
has achieved substantial proportionality between men’s enrollment and athletics, it is 
presumed to have accommodated the athletic interests of that sex.  Id. 
108 Id. at 639; see also Pieronek, supra note 105, at 103 (quoting Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639) 
(noting that the students “argu[ed] that they [had] a protected property interest in 
participating in athletics” and cutting the team would violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
and the court dismissed the action after recognizing that Title IX preempted equal 
protection claims (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
109 Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639.  The purpose of Title IX “is not to ensure that the athletic 
opportunities available to women increase.  Rather its avowed purpose is to prohibit 
educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex.”  Id. (quoting Kelley v. Bd. 
of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The elimination 
of the men’s soccer and wrestling teams by the university “were substantially related” to 
achieving this objective and complying with Title IX’s proportionality requirement.  Id.; see 
also Pieronek, supra note 105, at 104 (noting that in providing remedies under Title IX, 
Congress created a regime of redress of sex discrimination in athletics). 
110 Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639.  The court reflected its holding in Kelley and stated that 
“[w]hile the effect of Title IX and the relevant regulation and policy interpretation is that 
institutions will sometimes consider gender when decreasing their athletic offerings, this 
limited consideration of sex does not violate the Constitution” or Title IX.  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In Neal v. Board of Trustees,111 decided the same year as Boulahanis, the 
Ninth Circuit Court held that the university’s decision to reduce roster 
spots available to male athletes, to remedy imbalance between genders, 
did not violate Title IX.112  The cuts to the men’s wrestling program were 
made in compliance with a previous lawsuit in which the California 
State University system was found to be violating Title IX’s 
proportionality requirement.113  The district court granted a preliminary 
injunction preventing the reductions, stating that capping men’s teams to 
comply with Title IX violated the statute as a matter of law.114  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, stating 
that Title IX was not violated when the university cut opportunities for 
the overrepresented gender.115 
The men argued that equal opportunity is best achieved when each 
gender’s athletic participation roughly matches its interest in 
participating.116  However, the court ruled that basing compliance on 
                                                 
111 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). 
112 Id. at 770.  A university may “comply with Title IX by leveling down programs instead 
of ratcheting them up” to ensure substantial proportionality.  Id.  The court stated that 
“Title IX does not bar universities from taking steps to ensure that women are 
approximately as well represented in sports programs as they are in student bodies,” and 
therefore cuts to men’s athletic teams were not prohibited.  Id. at 773; see also Danielle M. 
Ganzi, Note, After the Commission:  The Government’s Inadequate Responses to Title IX’s 
Negative Effect on Men’s Intercollegiate Athletics, 84 B.U. L. REV. 543, 553 (2004) (noting that 
the court acknowledged that “the Policy Interpretation [of Title IX compliance] simply 
creates a presumption . . . that a school has violated Title IX if there is a statistical disparity 
between the sexes in their athletic program”). 
113 Neal, 198 F.3d at 765.  Female students made up 64% of the student body at California 
State University, Bakersfield (“CSUB”), but only represented 39% of the athletic 
population.  Id.  In response to a lawsuit filed by the National Organization for Women, 
CSUB agreed to adjust athletic participation to within five percentage points of the student 
enrollment.  Id.  At the time, “California was slowly emerging from a recession, and state 
funding . . . was declining,” creating a problem for schools that wished to expand 
opportunities.  Id.  CSUB adopted “squad size targets” to comply with Title IX by reducing 
the size of men’s teams across the board, instead of eliminating entire men’s teams.  Id. 
114 Id. at 766.  “The district court concluded as a matter of fact that CSUB’s primary 
motivation for capping the size of the men’s teams was to meet the gender proportionality 
requirements in the consent decree.”  Id.  It ruled that, as a matter of law, capping men’s 
teams violated Title IX.  Id.; see also Capasso, supra note 73, at 839 (noting that the district 
court granted the preliminary injunction in favor of the male athletes by ruling that the 
gender-based distinction in implementing cuts created a quota system, which was a 
violation of Title IX).  
115 Neal, 198 F.3d at 765; see also Ganzi, supra note 112, at 553 (stating that “the Ninth 
Circuit found that the district court had not deferred sufficiently to the Policy 
Interpretation” issued by the OCR regarding Title IX compliance). 
116 Neal, 198 F.3d at 767.  “Appellees therefore suggest that gender-conscious remedies 
are appropriate only when necessary to ensure that schools provide opportunities to males 
and females in proportion to their relative levels of interest in sports participation.”  Id.  
The court stated that male athletes have been given an enormous head start in athletics, 
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interest instead of composition of enrollment would ignore the fact that 
Title IX was enacted to remedy discrimination that results from gender 
stereotyped notions about women’s interests and abilities.117  Every court 
that has ruled on Title IX violations “has held that a university may bring 
itself into Title IX compliance by [either] increasing athletic opportunities 
for the underrepresented gender . . . or . . . decreasing athletic 
opportunities for the overrepresented gender.”118  Therefore, Title IX was 
not violated by the reduction in men’s roster spots to achieve substantial 
proportionality.119 
Finally, Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education is the most 
recent case involving Title IX violations and reverse discrimination in the 
elimination of men’s teams.120  In Equity in Athletics, an association of 
sports participants, coaches, and fans sued the ED claiming a Title IX 
violation.121  The lawsuit focused on James Madison University’s 
(“JMU”) decision to cut ten athletic teams from the athletic department 
to comply with Title IX.122  The court held that Title IX should not be 
                                                                                                             
and therefore Title IX “prompt[s] universities to level the proverbial playing field.”  Id.; see 
also Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 865 (noting that the court in Cohen ruled that the third prong 
of compliance “may require a university ‘to give the underrepresented gender . . . a larger 
slice of a shrinking athletic-opportunity pie’” (quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 
906 (1st Cir. 1993))). 
117 Neal, 198 F.3d at 768.  The central aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage 
women to participate in sports, but basing compliance on stereotypes of women’s interests 
does not allow that purpose to grow.  Id.  Title IX must be viewed as a dynamic statute that 
adjusts with the “continuing progress toward the goal of equal opportunity for all 
athletes.”  Id. at 769. 
118 Id. at 769–70; see id. at 770 (citing cases that recognize that institutions experiencing 
financial difficulties may have to resort to reducing the number of opportunities where it is 
impractical to increase opportunities). 
119 Id. at 773.  A university must provide athletic opportunities in proportion to the 
gender composition of the student body and this can be achieved “by increasing . . . 
opportunities for the underrepresented gender . . . or by decreasing opportunities . . . for 
the overrepresented gender.”  Id. at 770; see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913 
(noting that compliance by contraction is consistent with 1979 OCR interpretations of the 
Title IX regulations); Benedetto, supra note 35 (“Under Title IX, there must be 
proportionality between men’s and women’s teams based on the total enrollment at the 
school.”). 
120 675 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
121 Id. at 667.  The primary purpose for James Madison University’s (“JMU”) decision to 
cut teams was to bring the school into compliance with Title IX.  Id.  The Equity in Athletics 
Association (“EIA”) challenged the Title IX interpretive guidelines that permit colleges to 
engage in the kind of gender-based decision making that Title IX was intended to prevent.  
Id. 
122 Id. at 666.  In 2006, JMU decided to cut ten varsity athletic teams to bring itself into 
Title IX compliance.  Id.  The teams that were cut included men’s archery, cross-country, 
gymnastics, indoor track, outdoor track, swimming, and wrestling, as well as women’s 
archery, fencing, and gymnastics.  Id.  At the time of the cuts, JMU consisted of 61% women 
and 39% men within the student body and 51% women and 49% men in the athletic 
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interpreted to require proportionality between athletics and general 
enrollment, but the statute authorizes institutions to comply in such a 
manner.123  Therefore, Title IX is not violated when opportunities for the 
overrepresented sex are decreased based on gender.124 
“To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must [show] sufficient 
facts to ‘demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others’” in 
a similar situation and the treatment must be “‘the result of intentional 
or purposeful discrimination.’”125  The court ruled that JMU made 
gender-based cuts to ensure compliance with a federal law and not with 
the intention of discriminating against one sex.126  Therefore, JMU’s 
                                                                                                             
department.  Id.  After the cuts, the ratio of women participating in athletics would mimic 
that of enrollment (61% women and 39% men).  Id. at 667. 
123 Id. at 670.  The first prong of the three-part compliance test authorizes, rather than 
requires, schools to engage in gender balancing to comply with Title IX.  Id.  Although the 
statute does not require proportionality, it does not forbid it either.  Id.; see also Capasso, 
supra note 73, at 836 (noting that although Title IX does not require institutions to provide 
every athletic opportunity, it does “require[] an academic institution to establish a new 
team or upgrade an existing club team if there is a sufficiently high unmet need in the 
underrepresented gender”). 
124 Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 672.  In determining how an institution will 
comply with Title IX, it may sometimes consider gender when decreasing its athletic 
program, but such limited consideration does not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution.  Id. 
125 Id. at 679–80 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 576 (4th 
Cir. 2003)).  A plaintiff must present proof in the form of “sufficient facts to demonstrate 
that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that 
the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams, 326 F.3d at 576) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (stating 
that equal protection requires “that the [g]overnment must treat citizens as individuals, not 
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class” (quoting Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995))); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 
(1979) (noting that disparate impact and foreseeable consequences are relevant to prove an 
equal protection claim); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) 
(discussing equal protection claims in a school desegregation case and noting that equal 
protection of law is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Richard A. Primus, Equal 
Protection and Disparate Impact:  Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 514 (2003) (noting that 
motive is often a factor when determining whether there is a valid equal protection claim); 
A Brief History of School Desegregation, AUSTIN CHRON. (June 10, 2005), 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2005-06-10/274239/ (discussing equal protection 
as it applies to school desegregation). 
126 Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 680.  The university’s actions were taken in an 
attempt to comply with the requirements of Title IX and therefore were not considered 
“intentional or purposeful discrimination.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams, 326 
F.3d at 576); see also Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 837, 840 (2011) (noting that in Ricci v. DeStefano, decided in 2009, the government’s 
“ultimate aim . . . was to comply with [a] federal law” even though the actions were “race 
dependant in the sense that its actions likely would have been different but for the race of 
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decision to cut athletic teams to comply with Title IX proportionality 
requirements did not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause.127 
The differences in the outcome of traditional Title IX cases and the 
new reverse discrimination cases show that the courts are focused on 
remedying past discrimination against women, rather than the equality 
principle of Title IX.128  An in-depth look at the downfalls of Title IX’s 
current application—as well as an analysis of the proportionality and 
fully and effectively accommodated prongs of the compliance test—
shows that a change is necessary if Title IX’s goal of protecting all 
athletic participants, regardless of gender, is to be achieved.129 
III.  ANALYSIS 
This Part analyzes the Title IX statute, focusing primarily on the 
“proportionality” and “fully and effectively accommodated” compliance 
requirements under the three-prong test.130  Part III.A discusses 
problems with the evolution and application of Title IX’s three-prong 
compliance requirement test.131  Part III.B examines the proportionality 
requirement of Title IX compliance by analyzing the statute itself along 
with the courts’ interpretations of the requirement.132  Finally, Part III.C 
discusses the fully and effectively accommodated prong of the 
compliance requirements by analyzing the statutory language and the 
courts’ interpretations of this compliance prong.133 
A. Shortcomings in Title IX’s Evolution and Application 
When Title IX was enacted forty years ago, the purpose was to 
prohibit discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of 
                                                                                                             
those benefited or disadvantaged by it,” and the court invalidated such an action, ruling it 
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
127 Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 672.  Due to previous decisions regarding reverse 
discrimination and equal protection, the court chose to follow the trend and held that the 
plaintiff did not state a cause of action; therefore, the university was not prohibited from 
eliminating teams based on gender.  Id. 
128 See supra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing Title IX cases and the courts’ trends to rule in favor 
of female athletic teams and against men’s teams). 
129 See infra Part III (analyzing Title IX’s language and compliance requirements, as well 
as the problems caused by the current application of Title IX). 
130 See infra Parts III.A–C (analyzing Title IX and its compliance requirements while 
discussing the positive and negative effects resulting from the statute’s enactment). 
131 See infra Part III.A (examining Title IX’s negative effect on athletic departments due to 
its current application). 
132 See infra Part III.B (discussing the proportionality requirement under Title IX). 
133 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the fully and effectively accommodated prong of the 
Title IX compliance standards). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/8
2012] Unequal Equality 583 
gender.134  This was interpreted to mean creating opportunities for 
women where there previously were very few opportunities, such as in 
athletics.135  The statute has accomplished that goal, as there are more 
opportunities for women now than ever before.136  This may be one 
reason why institutions have a hard time complying with the second 
prong of the Title IX compliance standards, which requires showing a 
history and continuation of creating opportunities for the 
underrepresented gender.137  In today’s society, women have arguably 
the same opportunities as men throughout their development, especially 
when it comes to athletics.138  At some point, athletic programs may have 
no additional opportunities to offer; therefore, continued expansion is 
nearly impossible.139 
As currently applied, Title IX has come full circle and now creates 
discrimination solely on the basis of sex due to the application of the 
compliance requirements, which have many schools cutting men’s sports 
teams to meet the proportionality standard.140  Where Title IX was once a 
statute that focused on creating opportunities, it has now become a 
statute that is reducing opportunities for men based solely on their 
                                                 
134 See supra notes 14, 21 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX’s enactment and 
purpose). 
135 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 96-459, at 35 (1979), reprinted in 1979 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1612, 1614 (stating that the purpose for the Educational Amendments is to 
promote the general welfare of the United Sates); S. REP. NO. 96-49, at 10–11 (1979), 
reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1514, 1524–25 (noting that the need for equal access to 
educational activities is paramount; Title IX is specifically designed to help end sex 
discrimination); see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
removing the legacy of sexual discrimination, including discrimination in athletics, is an 
important government objective, and therefore the court must give deference to Congress 
in remedying this discrimination). 
136 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (noting the increase in women’s 
participation in sports, also showing that more women are participating in sports now than 
ever before). 
137 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (“[I]n light of the thirty [plus] years since 
Title IX’s passage, it is difficult for [a school] to boast a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion for women if the school still does not provide proportionally equal 
opportunities for both sexes.”). 
138 See GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 103 (noting that Title IX has allowed women athletes 
to come a long way in the participation of athletics as adolescents, as well as in colleges and 
in the creation of professional leagues); see also DEHASS, supra note 55, at 9 (stating that 
female athletes account for fifty percent of student-athletes in Division I, non-football 
schools, forty-one percent of student-athletes in Division II, and forty-two percent of 
Division III). 
139 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties with 
continued expansion of athletic programs to provide additional opportunities for women). 
140 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing reverse discrimination cases in which men’s teams 
bring claims against universities for Title IX violations when teams are cut). 
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gender.141  The spirit in which Title IX was enacted would be better 
achieved if opportunities were offered on the basis of competitiveness, 
interest, and feasibility, instead of the ratio of student-athletes by 
gender.142  The purpose of Title IX has been discarded in lieu of a quota 
system that requires universities to provide opportunities to student-
athletes, which are determined by gender instead of interest or 
competitiveness.143 
The current system of Title IX compliance has some positive effects 
as well as some drawbacks.144  The three-prong test that is used to 
determine compliance gives institutions multiple options, which they 
can use to determine how they will comply with the statute.145  Allowing 
schools to have more than one means of adhering to Title IX gives 
institutions flexibility, and therefore provides the opportunity for higher 
compliance rates.146  Also, the current system has been around for forty 
                                                 
141 See Robertson, supra note 7, at 307 (noting that from 1981–2001, men lost between 
57,100–57,700 participation opportunities, while in the same time period, women gained 
roughly 52,000 opportunities); compare H.R. REP. NO. 96-459, at 35 (1979), reprinted in 1979 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1612, 1614 (stating that the purpose of Title IX is to prohibit educational 
institutions from giving preferential or different treatment to members based on sex), with 
Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 769–70 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that cutting 
a men’s wrestling team does not violate Title IX because compliance is presumed in 
overrepresented gender even when teams are cut), Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 
633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that as long as proportionality of athletic opportunities 
shows an overrepresented gender, that gender is presumed to be fully and effectively 
accommodated), and Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the 
elimination of the swimming team did not violate Title IX because men’s participation in 
athletics remained substantially proportionate). 
142 See Alacbay, supra note 7, at 269 (discussing how capping and cuts hurt the overall 
competitive nature of athletic teams and the school as a whole, and that there is a double 
standard when schools make a gender-conscious decision toward a men’s team); see also 
McErlain, supra note 35 (discussing the practice of “roster management” and the problems 
it causes for coaches, teams, and the competitive nature of the sport in general (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
143 See Reich, supra note 7, at 569 (noting that even though men’s interest in athletics 
outweighs that of their female counterparts, men’s teams are still cut to comply with 
proportionality); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (noting that the proportionality standard 
gives universities little choice for compliance and therefore imposes a quota system); see 
also McErlain, supra note 35 (discussing the problems roster management causes for 
coaches, teams, and the competitive nature of the sport in general). 
144 See infra notes 145–54 and accompanying text (discussing the positives and negatives 
of the current Title IX three-prong compliance test). 
145 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text (examining the OCR regulations, which 
set out the three prong test, and how each of the prongs can be utilized to comply with 
Title IX). 
146 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905 (discussing Title IX compliance and how 
each of the different prongs may be satisfied, and also noting that universities choose to use 
different methods when determining compliance). 
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years; thus, institutions understand what is required under Title IX.147  
Courts have continuously applied the standards in similar ways and the 
interpretations have given universities direction in how to remain 
compliant.148 
The OCR Clarifications—which have been issued to try to remedy 
reverse discrimination claims and allow institutions to comply with Title 
IX by evaluating and accommodating the interest of the university—
have been unsuccessful and created more problems.149  There are no 
clear standards for evaluating the level of interest within the school, the 
surrounding community, and the athletic department, making 
assessment of interest a near impossibility for universities.150  Even 
worse, if a school is able to adequately assess interest, there is no 
direction for applying its findings to an athletic department to comply 
with Title IX and save itself from costly litigation in the future.151  Finally, 
the OCR has never set a standard for how often interest must be 
assessed, and therefore, how long an institution would be in compliance 
if it could meet this difficult standard.152  The clarifications have created 
more problems for institutions and courts who must decide if a school 
has fully and effectively accommodated the underrepresented gender in 
its athletic offerings.153  Therefore, reliance on the proportionality 
standards has become a way to ensure Title IX compliance.154 
                                                 
147 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 828–29 (discussing the history of Title IX and the 
compliance regulations set forth by the OCR); Hatlevig, supra note 7, at 90–97 (outlining the 
three prongs set forth by the OCR and how they can be applied by institutions to achieve 
compliance); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 290–91 (discussing the framework of Title IX 
compliance and its application to athletics); Reuscher, supra note 7, at 119–29 (discussing 
the three prong test and its application and interpretation regarding Title IX compliance). 
148 See supra text accompanying note 70 (highlighting that courts traditionally rule in 
favor of women’s sports teams in Title IX claims, applying the proportionality standard 
consistently to actions). 
149 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 840–46 (highlighting problems created by the Model 
Survey, which was issued in the 2005 Clarification by the OCR to further assess interest 
under the third prong of the compliance test). 
150 See id. (evaluating the subjective nature of the third prong and how a lack of standards 
creates uncertainty for schools); see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (noting that the 
proportionality standard gives universities little choice for compliance and therefore 
imposes a quota system). 
151 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 840–46 (describing the uncertainty caused by the third 
prong); Robertson, supra note 7, at 309 (noting that an alternative approach may be 
necessary due to a lack of objective direction and the result of women’s and men’s sports 
being pitted against each other). 
152 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 840–41 (noting that problems created from the Model 
Survey have gone unanswered by the OCR, including response rates and frequency of 
administering the survey). 
153 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (ruling that when there is 
sufficient interest and ability among the members of the underrepresented sex and a team 
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The application of the current Title IX compliance requirements can 
be compared to other areas of social change where remedying past 
discrimination has caused other forms of equal protection claims.155  The 
current problems in Title IX’s application parallel school desegregation 
cases, in which laws were passed to remedy past racial discrimination by 
forcing schools to desegregate and prohibit “separate but equal” 
educational institutions.156  However, it has recently been argued that 
forcing racial integration is equally as unconstitutional as racial 
segregation.157  Laws that require racial or gender based actions may be 
invalid even if they are designed to avoid disparate impact liability or 
remedy past discrimination.158  The current Title IX compliance system 
causes a disparate impact on men’s athletics—similar to the disparate 
impact laws involving racial classifications—and therefore should 
trigger an equal protection cause of action.159  Since courts do not 
                                                                                                             
is being eliminated, it is assumed that the institution is not fully and effectively 
accommodating that sex); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (noting that “it is 
difficult for a college to defend its lack of proportional opportunities by arguing that it has 
fully accommodated women’s interests and abilities” when there are Title IX compliance 
complaints). 
154 See infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing proportionality as the “safe 
harbor” of compliance). 
155 See Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that remedying past 
discrimination is an important government interest; therefore, if the proportionality of 
athletes favors the overrepresented gender, they will be presumed to be accommodated); 
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (stating 
that equal protection requires “that the [g]overnment must treat citizens as individuals, not 
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class”); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (discussing equal protection claims in a school 
desegregation case and noting that equal protection of law is guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
156 See A Brief History of School Desegregation, supra note 125 (noting that “separate but 
equal” laws were passed in 1896, but were then repealed in 1954 in Brown v. Board of 
Education); see also Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (noting that the OCR did not require parallel teams 
for men’s and women’s sports, but that solution would have been an easy way to ensure 
Title IX compliance). 
157 See Adams, supra note 126, at 883 (noting that recently the Supreme Court has adopted 
an “equivalence doctrine,” which states “that there is a moral [and] constitutional 
equivalence between laws designed to” segregate and those designed to integrate 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
158 See id. at 840 (discussing the Court’s ruling in Ricci and noting that even if the actions 
were intended to avoid disparate impact, the action may still qualify as “race-based,” and 
therefore would be invalid (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Columbus Bd. of 
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (noting that disparate impact and foreseeable 
consequences are relevant evidence to prove an equal protection claim). 
159 See Primus, supra note 125, at 538 (noting that disparate impact standards trigger 
heightened scrutiny in equal protection claims); id. at 515 (discussing Title VII disparate 
impact law as applied to racial classifications); see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Title IX 
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recognize such a claim in men’s athletic teams, changes to the current 
regulations should be used to remedy this problem.160 
The question then arises, what is the best standard to achieve 
equality in college athletics?  The answer is not as simple as picking one 
of the standards set forth in the three-prong test.161  To assess true 
equality of opportunities, a combination of these standards may be 
necessary.162  Both the proportionality and the fully and effectively 
accommodated standards have drawbacks in their language and 
application, but a combination of the two prongs may be the best way to 
satisfy all parties.163  Adequately assessing the interest in the athletics 
department and applying a standard that allows schools to offer 
opportunities that are proportionate to this level of interest would create 
a win-win situation.164 
B. Title IX’s Proportionality Requirement 
Schools most often choose to comply with Title IX by adhering to the 
proportionality standard of the three-prong compliance test.165  This is 
because it is the most objective and is considered the “safe harbor” by 
the courts.166  However, this prong is not necessarily the most “fair” 
                                                                                                             
cases brought by men’s athletic teams claiming equal protection claims and reverse 
discrimination). 
160 See infra Part IV (proposing a new compliance standard, which would remedy the 
courts’ refusal to recognize a cause of action in men’s Title IX claims). 
161 See infra Parts III.B–C (discussing the downfalls of both the first and third prongs of 
the Title IX compliance requirements). 
162 See infra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (suggesting that a combination of two of 
the compliance prongs may achieve a more equitable environment within athletic 
departments); infra Part IV (suggesting a new standard, which focuses on interest in 
athletic opportunities instead of focusing solely on gender). 
163 See infra Parts III.B–C (discussing the downfalls of both the first and third prongs of 
the Title IX compliance requirements). 
164 See infra Part IV (discussing the benefits of providing schools with a more objective 
and attainable standard for complying with Title IX). 
165 See supra notes 35, 41 and accompanying text (discussing schools’ reliance on the 
proportionality prong for Title IX compliance); see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 301 
(“[P]ractical considerations make it likely that schools will choose to satisfy the 
proportionality prong in order to comply with Title IX.”). 
166 See GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 105 (emphasis omitted) (stating that the 
proportionality standard is considered the “safe harbor” under the statute); Hatlevig, supra 
note 7, at 96 (noting that compliance under the “safe harbor” prong is the most widely 
pursued compliance requirement due to its objective nature); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 319 
(highlighting that cutting men’s sports teams appears to be the easiest and most clearly 
defined method of Title IX compliance); Robertson, supra note 7, at 301 (noting that 
compliance to the most objective of the tests—proportionality—helps prevent costly 
litigation by institutions, and that the OCR has designated the proportionality test the “safe 
harbor,” making it the most reliable standard). 
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measure of equality.167  There have been strong reactions to the 
proportionality standard and its application to college athletics.168  Title 
IX applies to all aspects of federally funded education, including 
extracurricular activities and classroom curriculum, as well as 
athletics.169  However, the application of equal opportunities in areas 
outside of sports is very different.170  In other programs, Title IX’s focus 
is to allow all interested parties to participate, where in athletics the 
focus is on the proportionality of participation.171  To ensure that men are 
not given the majority of athletic opportunities, Title IX prohibits sex 
discrimination and, in practice, if not in theory, imposes a quota 
system.172 
                                                 
167 See GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 106–07 (noting that the third prong, while difficult, is 
more equitable than the other prongs); Robertson, supra note 7, at 301–02 (stating that the 
third prong of Title IX compliance standards—fully and effectively accommodated—is 
probably the most fair and equitable measure of compliance). 
168 See Hatlevig, supra note 7, at 99–100 (explaining that reliance on the proportionality 
requirement creates hostility within institutions when teams are cut to save money, and 
also noting that proportionality under Title IX creates an atmosphere for reverse 
discrimination claims); Klinker, supra note 7, at 88 (giving a brief overview of how Title IX 
proportionality affects collegiate teams, especially men’s low-revenue-producing 
programs); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306–07 (discussing the negative effects resulting 
from the proportionality requirement, such as quota systems, discrimination against men 
based solely on gender, and divergence from the original goal of the enactment). 
169 See Daniel, supra note 7, at 293 (noting that the Title IX statute doesn’t mention 
athletics specifically and that it refers to all educational activities); Robertson, supra note 7, 
at 304–05 (explaining Title IX compliance as it relates to other areas of education, such as 
classroom settings). 
170 See Robertson, supra note 7, at 305 (noting that schools do not have separate male and 
female engineering majors within an institution, and therefore Title IX does not require that 
an equal number of engineering spots be filled by men and women, but rather that no one 
will be denied the opportunity to join the engineering program based on his or her sex); see 
also id. (explaining that the proportionality standard is applied differently to athletics 
where opportunities are designated based on gender). 
171 See Daniel, supra note 7, at 261–62 n.25 (quoting B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who 
Pays:  Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 647, 648 (1995)) 
(contemplating whether equality is determined by equal opportunity or equal 
participation, and that the debate is further complicated by the segregation of genders); 
Robertson, supra note 7, at 305 (noting that removing gender designations in athletics 
would allow focus to return to interest in participating and therefore create a less 
discriminatory method for enforcing Title IX, but the practical effect would be a decline in 
women’s participation in sports); see also supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing 
Title IX’s focus when considering areas outside of athletics). 
172 See Reuscher, supra note 7, at 157 (recognizing that despite the original intent and 
legislative history of Title IX, it currently operates as a quota system rather than an anti-
discrimination statute); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that by managing the 
number of roster spots on teams to fit within proportionality, Title IX essentially enforces a 
quota system on participation); McEldowney, supra note 35 (explaining that “compliance” 
for universities usually “means applying a quota standard”). 
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The current use of the proportionality prong provides institutions 
with a quantitative method to determine compliance under Title IX.173  
Also, since the proportionality prong is so commonly used by 
institutions and applied by courts, schools understand how to use the 
current standard for compliance via the athletic department.174  Members 
of the university, the administration, and the judicial branch can easily 
apply the current standard without fear of confusion.175  This benefit 
allows schools to know exactly what is expected of them to comply with 
the statute.176  However, this ease of use doesn’t necessarily make the 
proportionality standard the most equitable way of complying with Title 
IX.177 
Universities are left little practical choice when determining how to 
comply with Title IX proportionality.178  The schools’ choices are creating 
teams for the underrepresented gender or cutting teams for the 
overrepresented gender until the ratio of student-athletes to general 
enrollment is acceptable.179  Universities often feel compelled to cut 
                                                 
173 See Benedetto, supra note 35 (“[U]nder Title IX, there must be proportionality between 
men’s and women’s teams based on the total enrollment at the school.”); McEldowney, 
supra note 35 (explaining that compliance for universities usually means applying a quota 
standard that requires schools to maintain the “same ratio of men and women on the 
playing field as in the classroom”). 
174 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that the university had to provide athletic opportunities proportionate to the gender 
composition of the student body); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 
1999) (ruling that the university’s elimination of men’s soccer and wrestling programs 
helped to achieve Title IX compliance under the proportionality standard); see also 
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (noting that it is simply assumed that compliance 
will be measured in terms of substantial proportionality). 
175 See supra notes 74, 87, 100, 106, 113 and 122 (discussing courts’ interpretations of how 
to apply proportionality by evaluating the number of students in the institution’s general 
enrollment compared to the number of student-athletes of each gender, thereby setting the 
standard for application of proportionality). 
176 See Hatlevig, supra note 7, at 92–93 (discussing the first prong of the Title IX 
compliance test and noting that universities can rely on the objective nature of 
proportionality when complying with Title IX). 
177 See infra text accompanying notes 200–02 (noting that compliance is not best achieved 
by using the proportionality standard within athletics); see also infra Part IV (proposing a 
new standard that will allow schools to more equitably comply with Title IX). 
178 See Eckes, supra note 7, at 697 (noting that the practical result of Title IX is that many 
schools feel that the best way to comply is to cut men’s programs); Robertson, supra note 7, 
at 306 (pointing out that Title IX does not require schools to cut teams, but in lieu of 
creating opportunities for women in hard economic times, it seems to be the only practical 
possibility). 
179 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing that compliance by 
contraction is acceptable in lieu of creating more opportunities for women); see also supra 
notes 34, 77 and accompanying text (noting that schools may comply with Title IX by 
showing a history and continuation of program expansion). 
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men’s non-revenue sports to meet the requirements due to:  (1) the lack 
of economic resources in college athletic departments; (2) the drain on 
resources by revenue sports; and (3) the uncertainty in satisfying Title IX 
using any method other than proportionality.180 
There are also practicality problems with the proportionality 
standard when institutions and courts try to determine how to define 
substantial proportionality.181  Problems such as differences in roster-size 
requirements between men’s and women’s sports, revenue production, 
and levels of interest are among the major practicality concerns when 
applying the proportionality standard.182  Many suggestions have been 
proposed to remedy this impracticality; for instance, some argue that 
revenue-producing sports and non-revenue sports should be 
distinguished for Title IX purposes.183  Defining “sport” is an issue that 
                                                 
180 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913 (noting that compliance by contraction is 
consistent with 1979 OCR interpretations of the Title IX regulations, but draws battle lines 
between men’s and women’s athletic teams); Marburger & Hogshead-Makar, supra note 7, 
at 81–82 (recognizing that the marginal benefit of each dollar spent on football and 
basketball tends to exceed the marginal benefit of each dollar spent on non-revenue sports); 
Reich, supra note 7, at 553–56 (presenting problems with applying the proportionality 
standard and offering a solution to these application problems); Robertson, supra note 7, at 
306 (explaining that resources are needed to assist any sports team, especially high cost 
revenue-producing programs, and that with a drain on these resources, institutions view 
the elimination of men’s teams as the only viable solution to Title IX violations); see also 
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898–99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993) (indicating that Title IX 
does not require a school to continue to add money and programs into an athletic 
department, as “it can also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the 
accommodation test by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing opportunities 
for the overrepresented gender”). 
181 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(implying that institutions striving to be within five percentage points when evaluating the 
student-athlete to general enrollment ratio will be considered in compliance with the 
proportionality requirement); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that the ratio of student-athletes to general enrollment does not have to 
be exactly the same when determining proportionality, because if the two numbers are 
substantially similar, they will be accepted); see also GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 64 (noting 
that men’s athletic teams have become the victim of Title IX regarding compliance with the 
substantial proportionality requirement because they have historically been larger and 
better-funded). 
182 See infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that would help 
solve problems presented when applying the proportionality standard to athletic 
departments). 
183 See Reich, supra note 7, at 553 (discussing that in most schools, the major revenue-
producing sports, such as football and basketball, allow non-revenue sports to exist).  In 
2000, the average profit (revenue minus costs) generated from football and basketball alone 
was roughly $1.8 million, while all of women’s sports produced a $1.7 million deficit; 
therefore, revenue-producing sports should be exempt from the proportionality 
requirement because they make it possible for all other sports to operate.  Id.; see also 
Robertson, supra note 7, at 308 (noting large differences between revenue-producing sports 
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has also incurred much debate.184  Finally, the most prevalent argument 
has been that proportionality would be more fairly assessed by 
eliminating football from the proportionality equation.185  All of these 
proposed solutions would dramatically enhance the practicality of the 
proportionality standard for Title IX compliance by making application 
more equitable.186  However, these arguments have either been expressly 
rejected by courts or not accepted in Title IX interpretations.187  Applying 
                                                                                                             
and non-revenue sports of any gender, and that men’s non-revenue sports are suffering the 
consequences of the proportionality requirement’s interpretation solely because of their 
gender, which is a result that seems to attack the core purpose of Title IX). 
184 See Letter From Nat’l Coordinator of Title IX Athletics, supra note 42 (explaining that 
the OCR makes various inquiries when determining whether an activity is a “sport”).  To 
determine whether the activity is a sport, the OCR will consider the following on a case-by-
case basis: 
[W]hether selection for the team is based upon objective factors related 
primarily to athletic ability;  
[W]hether the activity is limited to a defined season;  
[W]hether the team prepares for and engages in competition in the 
same way as other teams in the athletic program with respect to 
coaching, recruitment, budget, try-outs and eligibility, and length and 
number of practice sessions and competitive opportunities;  
[W]hether the activity is administered by the athletic department; and,  
[W]hether the primary purpose of the activity is athletic competition 
and not the support or promotion of other athletes. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 94 (D. Conn 
2010) (ruling that cheerleading could not be used in the proportionality equation because it 
was not a sport according to the NCAA and therefore not governed by Title IX); Reich, 
supra note 7, at 556–57 (noting that the OCR is currently responsible for defining what is 
considered an “athletic opportunity” under the statute, and the definition that is currently 
used removes many possible student-athletes, such as competitive cheerleaders, from the 
equation). 
185 Reich, supra note 7, at 550–53 (providing statistics regarding female and male 
participation in sports, and specifically discussing the possibility of exempting football and 
basketball programs for Title IX purposes).  According to the NCAA, in 1999–2000, male 
athletic participants at Division I schools averaged 233.3, compared to 162.6 female athletes; 
however, 116.8 of the male athletes at these schools participated in football.  Id. at 553.  
Because there is no equivalent women’s sport in terms of roster spots, football skews the 
results of equal participation in sports.  Id.  If football is removed from the above 
calculation, female athletes actually outnumber male athletes 162.6 to 116.5.  Id. 
186 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 875 (discussing the impracticality of the three-prong test); 
Robertson, supra note 7, at 322 (noting that the purpose of Title IX is to create opportunities, 
and if the proportionality prong continues to be applied as it has been, opportunities for all 
athletes will decrease, therefore causing a drop in interest in non-revenue men’s sports as 
well as women’s sports). 
187 See Reich, supra note 7, at 569–70 (recognizing that the suggestions to adjust the 
proportionality standard to make it more reasonable have fallen on deaf ears in the OCR 
and the courts); see also Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 342 (3d Cir. 1993) (ruling that 
even though IUP offered more men’s teams than women’s teams, the focus should be on 
the total number of athletes when determining proportionality); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 
F.2d 888, 900 (1st Cir. 1993) (giving deference to the interpretation of the OCR and, 
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any of these proposed remedies would account for the realistic 
discrepancies between sports teams and would create a more equitable 
standard for Title IX compliance under the proportionality prong.188 
The final argument for improving the practicality of Title IX 
compliance has been to use a relative-interest proportionality standard.189  
Under this standard, the ratio of participating student-athletes would 
need to be proportionate to the level of comparative interest in 
participating in athletics.190  This argument is supported by evidence 
suggesting that the general student body is often not comparable to the 
pool from which athletes are drawn.191  In many cases, more women 
attend institutions of higher education for the sole purpose of obtaining a 
degree, rather than participating in athletics.192  The opposite is often 
true in the case of men; athletics play a much more important role in 
their decision to attend a college.193  Additionally, some argue that 
extracurricular activities should be evaluated as a whole instead of 
individually by program since the relative interest in other areas of 
                                                                                                             
therefore, evaluating compliance based on student-athletes, not total teams provided, while 
also rejecting Brown’s claim that proportionality should be based on relative interest 
instead of general student enrollment). 
188 See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text (providing various proposed remedies 
to resolve the issues resulting from the proportionality requirement under Title IX). 
189 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 (arguing that the institution should be allowed to 
satisfactorily accommodate female interest by offering “athletic opportunities to women in 
accordance with the ratio of interested and able women . . . regardless of the number of unserved 
women or the percentage of the student body that they comprise”). 
190 See id. (“[T]o the extent students’ interests in athletics are disproportionate by gender, 
colleges should be allowed to meet those interests incompletely as long as the school’s 
response is in direct proportion to the comparative levels of interest.”). 
191 See Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 288 (discussing the difference in the recruitment of 
athletes and students when compiling a student body); Robertson, supra note 7, at 307 
(noting that “college athletes are drawn from the pool of eligible people with the talent and 
interest in college athletics, which includes people from all over the globe,” while often 
times the general enrollment of a school is limited to a more centralized geographic area). 
192 See Robertson, supra note 7, at 308 (discussing that women’s athletics are often viewed 
as extracurricular activities that complement the primary purpose of obtaining a quality 
education).  See generally Favia, 7 F.3d at 335 (noting that 56% of the university’s population 
consisted of female students, but only 38% competed in athletics); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. 
of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (“During the three years that were the subject 
of . . . review, the differences between women enrolled and women athletes were 7.5%, 
12.5%, and 12.7%.”); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (acknowledging the disproportionate ratio of 
female student-athletes to women as general members of an institution’s enrollment). 
193 See Reich, supra note 7, at 569 (noting that the desire to participate is often higher in 
men, and providing that the average men’s track team will attract thirty-two members, 
while the corresponding female team will attract only twenty-seven); Robertson, supra note 
7, at 308 (noting that men’s athletics, especially revenue-producing sports, tend to take the 
priority in a student’s life over his academics, thereby causing the apparent discrepancy in 
interest).  See generally Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (noting the swing in enrollment numbers from 
the 1970s to the present day and accounting for part of the proportionality problem). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/8
2012] Unequal Equality 593 
education—such as music and theatre—tends to be higher in women; 
and, therefore, the overall ratio of extracurricular participants is 
relatively equal.194  Looking at relative interest when determining 
proportionality of participation is a more fair assessment of equality of 
opportunities than the general enrollment standard.195 
The relative-interest standard has been rejected by courts, however, 
in favor of the standard proportionality equation.196  As mentioned 
earlier, it has been noted that opportunity breeds interest in athletics.197  
Therefore, limiting opportunities to the amount of interest currently 
assumed would suppress the advancement of any sport, but specifically 
women’s sports.198  Also, by relying on relative interest, the school 
detracts from the legislature’s desire to remedy past discrimination 
against women in educational settings and promotes stereotypes about 
women in athletics.199  Finally, it is argued that the relative-interest 
standard causes problems in assessing the interest level due to its 
subjective nature.200 
                                                 
194 See Hueben, supra note 7, at 673–74 (stating that the proportionality challenge, under 
Title IX, is that athletics tend to get separated from all other collegiate activities); Robertson, 
supra note 7, at 308 (noting that other extracurricular activities apply a different standard 
than athletic departments are required to apply when assessing Title IX compliance). 
195 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 (discussing Brown’s argument that comparative interest 
better assesses the satisfaction of the program based on those that are actually willing and 
able to participate). 
196 See id. at 899–900 (ruling that Brown’s argument that the proportionality standard 
should be a relative interest was wrong as a matter of law and policy, stating that the 
policy would stifle advancement of women in athletics and promote common stereotypes); 
see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that other jurisdictions had rejected the “relative interests” argument, and that a 
school can comply with Title IX by providing opportunities proportionate to the general 
enrollment of the university, and therefore, followed suit). 
197 See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900 (stating that opportunity breeds interest and women would 
benefit from expansion of opportunities). 
198 See id. (stating that evaluating interest and ability under situations where women are 
provided less opportunities would not be an effective assessment of true interest); see also 
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 846 (discussing that the Model Survey, a tool to judge interest, 
creates a standard that institutions rely on, and possibly creates a system where the status 
quo is continued and new opportunities no longer seem to be necessary); Reich, supra note 
7, at 556–57 (noting that the OCR’s interpretation of “athletic opportunities” may be 
partially to blame for limitations on female participation under Title IX, rather than 
unfounded stereotypes). 
199 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’ desire to remedy past 
discrimination under Title IX). 
200 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 841–46 (discussing ambiguities under the Model Survey 
of judging interest, and noting that problems include response rates, passive responses, 
and the subjective nature of questions). 
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Even though most schools choose to comply with the proportionality 
standard, there are many problems with its practicality.201  Aside from 
creating a quota system that institutions must follow, it often creates a 
reverse discrimination effect against men’s teams.202  Title IX’s 
proportionality standard is not the most effective method of achieving 
equality, though it is often the easiest.203 
C. The Fully and Effectively Accommodated Standard 
The third prong of the Title IX compliance test is a more equitable 
method of providing equal opportunities for members of both 
genders.204  Determining whether there is full and effective 
accommodation depends on many factors such as satisfaction in the 
current program, whether there is unmet interest, and whether there is a 
waste of adequate talent by not providing a given athletic team.205  
Evaluating interest in athletic opportunities would allow athletic 
departments to offer programs that equally accommodate all parties, 
which is what the third prong attempts to achieve.206  However, there are 
drawbacks to this compliance requirement as well.207 
                                                 
201 See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text (discussing the practicality problems 
with Title IX’s proportionality standard as it is currently applied to institutions). 
202 See Reuscher, supra note 7, at 157 (recognizing that despite the original intent and 
legislative history of Title IX, it currently operates as a quota system and not an anti-
discrimination statute); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that by managing the 
number of roster spots on teams to fit within proportionality, Title IX essentially enforces a 
quota system on participation). 
203 See Robertson, supra note 7, at 302 (noting that the third prong of the compliance test is 
probably the most fair and equitable measure of compliance, but is hard to satisfy). 
204 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 836 (stating that allowing schools to use surveys to assess 
interest in athletics provides a more accurate representation of students’ needs and 
therefore is a better option for Title IX compliance); Robertson, supra note 7, at 304 (noting 
that focusing on interest instead of hard numbers to determine Title IX compliance is a 
more equitable way of assessing accommodation). 
205 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (noting that unmet interest and satisfaction 
in the current program should be factors used to determine Title IX compliance under the 
third prong of the test); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(stating that there would be a waste of talent and interest if Brown University was allowed 
to cut the women’s gymnastics and volleyball teams, and therefore they had not “fully and 
effectively” accommodated the female athletes). 
206 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (setting out guidelines for institutions to 
use when evaluating interest and ability and, therefore, creating a more practical 
alternative to the proportionality standard); see also Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 836 (stating 
that allowing schools to use surveys to assess interest in athletics provides a more accurate 
representation of students’ needs and therefore is a better option for Title IX compliance). 
207 See infra notes 208–17 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the current 
Title IX standards under the third prong of the compliance requirements). 
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The first, and largest, problem with the third prong of the 
compliance test is the subjectivity of the regulation’s language and the 
interpretation by the OCR and courts.208  Whether there is unmet interest 
and ability is assessed first when determining Title IX compliance under 
this prong.209  Unmet interest and ability, along with a reasonable 
expectation for a competitive team, are the only guidelines that are given 
under the fully and effectively accommodated test.210  Questions arise as 
to how to define “interest,” “ability,” and “competitive” in this 
context.211  It is presumed that there is a necessary level of interest and 
ability when a team is being cut from an athletic program, regardless of 
the reason given for the cuts.212  Finally, there may also be difficulty in 
determining the level of interest in other areas, such as community 
support, financing, and coaching, which add to the confusion in 
applying the standard.213  This subjective approach to measuring interest 
and ability creates a problem for institutions looking to comply under 
this prong of the compliance test.214 
                                                 
208 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 833 (noting that part of the problem with the Model 
Survey was the lack of a clear standard to assess interest and ability, and also stating that 
the third prong of the compliance test is often skipped when determining compliance 
because schools are nervous about litigation and proving accommodation). 
209 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (stating that unmet interest is measured by 
the following criteria:  “whether an institution uses nondiscriminatory methods of 
assessment when determining the athletic interests and abilities of its students; whether a 
viable team for the underrepresented sex recently was eliminated; multiple indicators of 
interest; multiple indicators of ability; and frequency of conducting assessments”). 
210 See id. (noting that when determining compliance for the third prong, the OCR will 
consider whether there is unmet interest, sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport, 
and whether there is a reasonable expectation of competition for the team). 
211 See id. (setting out criteria for assessment of the three factors, as the purpose is to 
provide a clearer standard of assessment under the third prong); see also Buzuvis, supra 
note 7, at 836 (discussing how the lack of concrete definitions creates confusion for 
institutions looking to show that interest and ability have been accommodated). 
212 See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that once Duke 
allowed Mercer to try out for the team, revoking her ability to play showed that her interest 
and ability was unmet, and this was the starting point for Title IX analysis); Favia v. Ind. 
Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the elimination of women’s sports 
teams showed interest and ability sufficient to invoke analysis under the third prong of the 
compliance test); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 902 (1st. Cir. 1993) (noting that since 
the team brought an action under Title IX, the school was presumed not to be “fully and 
effectively” accommodating student-athletes). 
213 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 851–56 (discussing the role of coaches, educators, and the 
community in shaping and determining interest and ability in athletics). 
214 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905–06 (stating that the third prong of Title IX 
compliance creates a difficult, but not impossible standard); GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 
106–07 (noting that the first prong is often used in Title IX due to its ease, but that the third 
prong, while difficult, is more equitable). 
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The courts have also had trouble articulating how institutions should 
apply the third-prong of the Title IX compliance requirements.  Most 
courts have noted that the standard of full and effective accommodation 
is high, yet not unattainable, but have never given any concrete methods 
that would satisfy this prong.215  With the lack of direction in applying 
this prong and the fear of costly lawsuits, universities are often afraid to 
attempt to comply with Title IX through this prong and, consequently, 
must rely on other compliance standards.216  This creates problems in the 
true equality of college athletic programs.217 
In spite of these ambiguities, interest is a better way of assessing the 
satisfaction in opportunities provided in an athletic department than 
proportionality; therefore, the third prong of the compliance test is still a 
viable option for schools to consider.218  As previously noted, the 
standard is high, but it is not impossible to meet; if done correctly, 
gender equity in athletics may finally hit a point where all members are 
                                                 
215 See Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that an institution may 
assess interest as it sees fit to comply with Title IX’s third prong); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900 
(noting that the third prong of the compliance test is often difficult to assess due to the 
subjective nature of evaluating interest); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905 
(noting that although the third prong sets a high standard, it is not absolute); Hueben, supra 
note 7, at 669 (discussing the “effective accommodation test” and how it applies in limited 
circumstances). 
216 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 833 (stating that because the OCR’s multifactor approach 
to prong three is based on qualitative, subjective factors, institutions are uncertain of 
whether their athletic programs satisfy the standard or whether they can successfully 
defend the program in court); Hueben, supra note 7, at 681 (“[M]easuring women’s interest 
in sports . . . [is] much more difficult than simply matching up numbers.”). 
217 See generally Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(alleging a Title IX and equal protection violation by a university for eliminating a number 
of roster spots on the men’s wrestling team to comply with Title IX proportionality); 
Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1999) (presenting a lawsuit 
involving male athletes who brought claims against a university for violating Title IX and 
discriminating based on sex when it eliminated the men’s soccer and wrestling programs to 
comply with Title IX’s proportionality requirement); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267 (involving a case 
where athletes alleged that Title IX was violated when the men’s swimming program was 
cut, but the women’s program was retained); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 
F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (W.D. Va. 2009) (claiming that Title IX regulations that imposed gender 
equality in federally financed programs and resulted in the elimination of athletic teams 
were unconstitutional). 
218 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (setting out criteria for assessment of the 
three factors and noting that the purpose is to provide a clearer standard of assessment 
under the third prong); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905–06 (stating that the 
third prong of Title IX compliance creates a difficult, but not impossible standard); GLOVER, 
JR., supra note 58, at 106–07 (noting that the first prong is often used in Title IX due to its 
ease, but that the third prong, while difficult, is more equitable); Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 
875 (noting that with some changes to the interpretation, the third prong of the test and 
even the Model Survey could be a good assessment of Title IX compliance). 
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satisfied with the system.219  With the recent OCR clarification, the 
ambiguities in how to assess interest and abilities should lessen and 
therefore make this particular prong even stronger.220 
Although no single compliance standard under Title IX is a perfect 
solution to offering truly equal opportunities in athletics, equality may 
be reached by combining the current requirements in a more practical 
way.221  The negative effects of the proportionality standard may be 
balanced by the positive effects of the fully and effectively 
accommodated requirement, and vice versa.222  Ultimately, if an 
institution is given a more concrete way of adequately assessing the level 
of interest in athletic programs and is able to offer opportunities that 
correspond to that level of interest, Title IX may finally produce a system 
that offers true equality.223 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Title IX has lost its focus on equality and providing equal 
opportunities, regardless of sex, due to the current application of the 
OCR’s three prong test.224  When assessing Title IX complaints, courts 
have repeatedly shown deference to the agency’s methods of 
determining compliance.225  This usually falls on the proportionality 
                                                 
219 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (explaining the standards for meeting 
the third prong of the Title IX compliance requirement and the difficulty in reaching full 
and effective accommodation). 
220 See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (setting out criteria for assessment of the 
three factors and noting that the purpose is to provide a clearer standard of assessment 
under the third prong); see also Hosick, supra note 47 (stating that NCAA President, Jim 
Ische, was optimistic about the new clarification and its potential effect on Title IX 
compliance). 
221 See supra Parts III.B–C (discussing the shortcomings of both the proportionality and 
fully and effectively accommodated standards under Title IX compliance); see also infra Part 
IV (discussing the benefits of combining these two prongs into a more objective standard). 
222 See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 875 (noting that the OCR may rescind the Model Survey 
under prong three, but it must also provide additional clarification if it expects institutions 
to understand its requirements because subjective standards send mixed messages); Reich, 
supra note 7, at 549–50 (discussing recommendations for future interpretation of Title IX, 
including redefining some of the language and interpreting the prongs in a manner 
consistent with the intent of Title IX). 
223 See infra Part IV (discussing the benefits of providing schools with a more objective 
and attainable standard for complying with Title IX). 
224 See supra Part III (evaluating the shortcomings of the Title IX compliance requirements 
and their current application). 
225 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. St. Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that the clarifications issued by the OCR deserved substantial deference); Kelley v. Bd. of 
Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “where Congress has specifically 
delegated” regulation to an agency, the court “must accord the ensuing regulation 
considerable deference”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The 
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standard of the three prong test, which has caused new forms of sex 
discrimination.226  To provide opportunities that are truly fair and not 
based solely on gender, the OCR should amend its compliance test to 
focus on interest and providing opportunities that coincide with the 
assessed level of interest, so all students are equally accommodated.  The 
compliance test should also be amended to provide schools with a 
practical and objective standard that can easily be applied to athletic 
departments. 
The OCR, which is in charge of ensuring that educational institutions 
are in compliance with Title IX, should amend its Policy Interpretation to 
outline the three-part test as follows: 
Proposed Amendment to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 
Fed. Reg. 71,418227 
 a. Compliance will be assessed in any one either of 
the following ways: 
 (1) Whether intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities for male and female students are 
provided in numbers substantially proportionate to 
their respective enrollments determined level of 
interest as provided in parts b and c of this regulation; or 
 (2) Where the members of one sex have been 
and are underrepresented among intercollegiate 
athletes, [W]hether the institution can show a 
history and continuing practice of program 
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the 
developing interest and abilities of the members of 
that sex student body. 
 (3) Where the members of one sex are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, 
and the institution cannot show a continuing 
                                                                                                             
degree of deference [given] is particularly high in Title IX cases because Congress explicitly 
delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic programs.”); Equity in 
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 676 (W.D. Va. 2009) (concluding that 
the OCR’s 1979 Policy Interpretation constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the Title IX 
regulations and therefore is entitled to deference). 
226 See supra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing cases under Title IX and the courts’ reliance on the 
proportionality standard as a “safe harbor” for Title IX compliance, which allows schools to 
comply by cutting men’s teams). 
227 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).  
The proposals are the contributions of the author.  Specifically, proposed additions are 
italicized and proposed deletions are struck.  The language in regular font is taken from the 
original regulation. 
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practice of program expansion such as that cited 
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the 
interests and abilities of the members of that sex 
have been fully and effectively accommodated by 
the present program. 
 b. Interest shall be determined by assessing all of the 
following criteria: 
 (1) Number of interested participants in an athletic 
opportunity; 
 (2) Number of available and interested support staff 
for an athletic opportunity, including but not limited to, 
coaches, trainers, tutors, and other management; 
 (3) Amount of available resources within the athletic 
department that may be provided to an athletic 
opportunity; 
 (4) Amount of potential outside donations that the 
institution will incur from an athletic opportunity; 
 (5) Level of interest in television, radio, and other 
broadcast mediums within the area for an athletic 
opportunity; 
 (6) Level of expected community interest and 
involvement in an athletic opportunity; 
 (7) Level of expected competition within the 
institution’s normal competitive region for an athletic 
opportunity. 
 c. Institutions are not required to upgrade teams to 
intercollegiate status or otherwise develop 
intercollegiate sports absent a reasonable expectation 
that intercollegiate competition in that sport will be 
available within the institution’s normal competitive 
regions shall evaluate the above factors to determine the 
quantitative level of interest in current and potential athletic 
opportunities.  Institutions shall determine this level of 
interest yearly by evaluating current and potential athletic 
offerings. 
Commentary 
The amended regulation makes the necessary changes to allow 
institutions to provide athletic opportunities that reflect the interest of 
the student body, the surrounding community, and any other followers 
of the athletic department.  It shifts the focus of the compliance 
requirements from proportionality of gender to interest, allowing 
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institutions to provide opportunities that equally accommodate all 
interested parties. 
First, in section a, the proposed amendment changes the compliance 
test from a three-prong test to a two-prong test.228  Institutions can 
comply with the amended regulations by either offering opportunities 
based on proportionality of interest in athletic opportunities, or by 
showing a history and continuance of providing opportunities 
responsive to the interests and abilities of the student body.  By adding 
the element of interest to the first prong, the subjective fully and 
effectively accommodated prong is no longer necessary since 
accommodation is factored into the first prong of the new test.  This 
eliminates some of the confusion for institutions who wish to use interest 
as a Title IX standard.229 
Since it is impossible for an institution to provide all the 
opportunities that may be desired, the proposed amendment still allows 
the use of proportionality; but, instead of focusing on general enrollment 
numbers—which do not consider personal preferences in educational 
experience—it focuses on the interest in the athletic department.230  
Courts have often noted that opportunity breeds interest and that by 
allowing schools to use relative interest as a standard for compliance, 
institutions will be adding to the status quo and stereotype that women 
are generally less interested in athletics.231  However, by using a 
quantitative evaluation of interest, this problem will resolve itself 
because interest levels won’t be based on stereotypes or assumptions, 
but on numbers collected by the athletic department.  The objective 
standard that is created by the proposed amendments removes bias, 
stereotypes, and skewed thinking when determining what athletic 
opportunities to offer, and replaces these mentalities with quantitative 
numbers that assess actual interest and ability of the program.232  By 
                                                 
228 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing the original regulations for 
Title IX compliance set forth by the OCR in the 1979 Policy Interpretation). 
229 See supra notes 208–11 (discussing the subjective nature of the third prong of the Title 
IX compliance requirements—fully and effectively accommodated—and the problems 
associated with this subjective standard). 
230 See supra note 191 (discussing that college athletes are drawn from the pool of eligible 
people with the talent and interest in college athletics, which includes people from all over 
the globe, while often times the general enrollment of a school is limited to a more 
centralized geographic area). 
231 See supra notes 189–200 and accompanying text (discussing the relative-interest 
argument as viewed by courts and other academics). 
232 See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text (discussing the relative interest 
argument of Title IX compliance and the stereotyped mindsets that often occur when using 
the subjective interest standard). 
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using the new proposed system of assessment, interest will breed 
opportunities that are well supported and competitive. 
The second prong of the amended compliance test, under section a, 
again takes the focus away from gender and puts it on interest and 
ability.  If an institution can show a history and continuation of 
providing athletic opportunities, which reflects the interests and abilities 
of all members of the student body who wish to participate, Title IX 
would be presumed satisfied.  This prong would act as a “safeguard” for 
universities that do not want to worry about assessing interest, but can 
show program expansion that accommodates the general student 
body.233  Essentially, this prong would create an option and give 
institutions an alternative to the standard assessment under the new 
Title IX interest regulation outlined in subsection (1). 
As stated above, the third prong of the original compliance 
requirements has been removed under section a, due to its application 
difficulty and subjective nature, and has been added to the 
proportionality standard in subsection (1).234  By allowing schools to 
comply with Title IX through evaluating and focusing on an objective 
standard of interest instead of the athletes’ gender, institutions will be 
able to provide opportunities based on interest and estimated 
competitiveness that accommodate all parties equally.  It is likely that 
even under the new standard, some athletes will still feel they are not 
completely accommodated by the offerings of an athletic department.  
However, under the amended regulation, it can be presumed that this is 
the result of a lack of interest and competitiveness in a particular 
opportunity, and not because of the athletes’ gender.235 
This revision also provides institutions with objective, practical, and 
measurable standards to evaluate interest in athletic opportunities under 
section b of the amended regulations.236  Criteria (1) and (2), under 
                                                 
233 The second prong of the compliance test would allow institutions to be presumed 
compliant under Title IX as long as there are no recorded complaints alleging 
discrimination or lack of opportunities in the athletic department.  If a university can show 
that the athletic department has satisfied its students by offering programs that 
accommodate its student body, the school will be viewed as compliant under Title IX. 
234 See supra notes 208–11 (discussing the subjective nature of the third prong of the Title 
IX compliance requirements—fully and effectively accommodated—and the problems 
associated with this subjective standard).  By adding assessment of accommodation based 
on interest and ability to the first prong of the compliance test, institutions are able to 
provide athletic opportunities that meet an objective standard and therefore are more 
equitable. 
235 See infra notes 237–45 and accompanying text (discussing the quantitative standards of 
the new proposed regulations and the benefits of the objective standard). 
236 Section b of the above revised regulation is the original idea of the author and not an 
amendment or revision of any current standard.  Each of the subsections under this 
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section b, will provide an institution with a quantitative number of 
interested participants in a given sport.237  If this number is large enough 
to sustain a competitive team, the institution should move on to 
evaluating criteria (3) and (4), which focus on the amount of resources 
available to an athletic opportunity.238  Institutional resources are often 
limited, which further evidences the importance of this criteria when 
determining what teams should be offered by an athletic department.239  
During hard economic times, institutions find it more difficult to provide 
adequate athletic opportunities.240  These factors will give the athletic 
department a clear view of whether there are adequate funds to support 
a particular team.241 
Next, institutions will evaluate the level of support the team will 
receive from outside sources, such as broadcast media and the 
surrounding community.  Institutions should use evaluation tools such 
as Likert scales, which are designed to measure interest using a standard 
five-point scale, to assess the level of interest in the sources listed in 
                                                                                                             
provision are designed to measure interest, abilities, and resources available for proposed 
athletic opportunities in an objective and measurable manner.  The criteria under section b 
should be used to assess the level of interest in a program under section a(1) above.  To 
better understand how this criteria should be assessed, a hypothetical scenario will be 
used.  PU is evaluating interest in the men’s hockey team under section a(1) of the new 
Title IX compliance standard by using the criteria set out in section b of this regulation. 
237 Under subsection (1), PU assesses that there are twenty-two willing and able students 
who are interested in participating on the men’s hockey team.  Under subsection (2) of the 
criteria, PU determines that four well-known and qualified individuals would be interested 
in coaching the men’s hockey team, two members of the university’s training staff would 
be interested in working with the team, and three members of the university’s faculty 
would be willing to serve as tutors, as needed, for the members of the team during the 
hockey season.  There would also be four graduate assistants interested in serving as 
managers, statisticians, and student coaches for the team. 
238 After assessing the financial position of the athletic department, PU determines that it 
can devote approximately $80,000 of its operating budget to support a men’s hockey team 
each season.  PU also concludes, under subsection (4), that outside donations of alumni, 
sponsors, and fundraising will provide an additional $30,000 per year to the hockey 
program. 
239 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing the limited resources 
currently available to most athletic departments and the resulting cuts in sports teams). 
240 See supra notes 41, 56, 180 and accompanying text (discussing the virtual impossibility 
of choices that institutions have to make in hard economic times when providing more 
opportunities). 
241 While the objective criteria set out in section b is helpful for institutions determining 
whether an athletic opportunity is viable in hard economic times, the same standard can 
also be used during times of economic stability or prosperity to assess whether an athletic 
opportunity has the desired level of interest and support.  The proposed assessment criteria 
will be relevant and useful in all economic states. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/8
2012] Unequal Equality 603 
interest criteria (5) and (6).242  After collecting the data, institutions 
would have a clear picture of whether the athletic opportunity would 
have support from these outside parties in an objective, measurable 
form.  Finally, the institution should determine whether the proposed 
athletic opportunity would be competitive within its normal region 
under subsection (7).243  Once all seven factors of the above criteria have 
been assessed, the institution should provide opportunities that meet all 
the factors and refrain from providing opportunities that do not meet the 
interest standards.244  As stated previously, it is not necessary for schools 
to provide every athletic opportunity and pour money into sports to the 
detriment of the athletic department and school, but an institution would 
be required to offer proportionate athletic opportunities based on 
quantitative interest. 
Lastly, the proposed amended regulation removes the note that a 
school is not required to provide opportunities in which it would not be 
competitive, under section c, because this is covered by criterion (7) of 
                                                 
242 Under subsection (5), PU sends out a number of Likert scale surveys to assess the level 
of interest in broadcast media among the local and regional areas.  The questions require 
broadcast stations, newspapers, and other media sources to rank, on a scale of one to five—
one being “completely uninterested” and five being “extremely interested”—their interest 
in covering news about the men’s hockey program.  Areas of inquisition include game 
scores and highlights, roster or coaching changes, recruitment, community involvement by 
the members of the team, and other newsworthy information.  After retrieving the 
responses and averaging the results, PU determines that the media industry would be 
“very interested” (a 4 on the Likert scale) in covering news about the men’s hockey team.  
PU then sends out similar surveys to assess the level of interest to members of the 
surrounding community, including residents of the area, students and employees of PU, 
members of opposing schools in PU’s athletic conference, and alumni of the university per 
subsection (6).  After this assessment, PU concludes that members of the community would 
be “interested” (a 3 on the Likert scale) in supporting a men’s hockey team at PU. 
243 PU assesses the level of competitiveness of the potential members of its own hockey 
team compared to other teams that would compete against PU.  A quantitative standard, 
such as statistical data or another developed method of competitive evaluation, is used to 
determine whether the team is a viable option for the school.  This can be determined by 
looking at past history, if the school is evaluating whether a current team should continue 
to compete at the varsity level, or by using statistics or other objective surveys created by 
the school to assess a team that has not been offered in the past.  After evaluating the past 
performance of the men’s hockey team, PU determines that the team would continue to be 
competitive within its conference and at the national level. 
244 After collecting all the data, PU should continue to offer men’s hockey as a team in its 
athletic department.  It has assessed that there is substantial interest within the athletic 
community, as well as the outside community, to support the team.  It has also determined 
that financial resources support offering men’s hockey at the university, and that the team 
will most likely continue to be competitive and bring exposure to the school.  Based on the 
numbers provided by the seven outlined criteria, men’s hockey is a feasible option that PU 
should provide. 
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the interest evaluation factors listed in section b.245  The new language of 
this section explains that institutions shall use the above criteria to 
acquire a quantitative assessment of interest in athletic opportunities, 
and that this evaluation should be conducted on a yearly basis.  When 
researching the level of interest and sustainability of athletic 
opportunities, institutions should focus on current programs as well as 
programs that may be added in the future.  This will allow schools to 
offer athletic opportunities that are well supported, competitive, and 
sustainable, thereby accommodating students, the athletic department, 
the institution, and the community alike. 
The proposed changes to the OCR’s regulation of Title IX compliance 
will allow institutions to provide athletic opportunities that will bring 
value to the school, all parties involved in the athletic department, and 
the surrounding community without focusing on the gender of the 
athletes.  The changes create an objective standard that universities can 
use in Title IX compliance assessment instead of the subjective, unclear 
test currently used to assess interest under the third prong of the 
compliance requirements.  Under this system, equality can be achieved 
by evaluating interest and ability of participants and ensuring that no 
person is prohibited from participating in athletics based solely on his or 
her gender, which was Title IX’s original intent. 
Critics of this proposal may argue that focus on interest instead of 
proportionality will hurt women’s athletics and benefit only male 
athletes.246  The argument may be that this proposal could send women 
back forty years to a situation similar to the 1970s, when Title IX was 
considered a necessity.247  However, the proposed amendment will not 
hurt women’s athletics in such a way that they will become obsolete.  
Shifting the focus of compliance to a system that allows schools to use an 
objective standard of viability for each team will allow women’s teams to 
thrive once they show that they are willing and able to support a 
competitive team.248  The objective system created by the proposed 
amendments will benefit both men’s and women’s teams by allowing 
                                                 
245 See supra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining criterion (7) of the interest 
assessment in determining whether a team will be competitive and allowing schools to 
provide only opportunities in which it is reasonably assessed that teams will be successful). 
246 See Hogshead-Makar, supra note 43 (noting that using interest for Title IX compliance 
may have negative effects on women’s teams and may lead to more discrimination by 
creating a loophole for universities). 
247 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing women’s participation in 
sports before Title IX was passed and the rise in numbers of female athletes after its 
enactment). 
248 See supra notes 237–45 and accompanying text (discussing the quantitative standards 
of the new proposal and explaining how each criterion should be applied to athletic 
opportunities, and also discussing the benefits of using the objective standard). 
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them to be assessed individually.  Men’s and women’s teams will no 
longer have to compete against each other to satisfy a quota; they will 
only need to show that they can be supported on their own, thereby 
creating more equitable opportunities for all athletes, regardless of 
gender. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Title IX’s current application is causing men’s athletic teams to be cut 
at an alarming rate to comply with the substantial proportionality prong 
of the OCR regulations.  This is contrary to the initial purpose of Title IX, 
which was to prohibit discrimination in participation of activities based 
solely on the individual’s sex.  Women have been discriminated against 
in the past, but by continuing the current application of the statute, the 
discrimination has come full circle and is reducing men’s athletic 
opportunities.  By amending the compliance requirement to allow 
institutions to focus on their students’ interests and abilities and other 
outside supporters, Title IX can once again provide opportunities for all 
individuals, regardless of gender, thereby creating true equality in 
college athletics.  Both genders will be equally represented based on 
interest, ability, and competitiveness, rather than attempting to satisfy a 
quota system that focuses on remedying past discrimination instead of 
true equality. 
After Title IX’s compliance amendment, schools will be able to offer 
programs that are well supported and competitive without focusing on 
the athletes’ gender.  This allows students like Aaron to choose a school 
that offers athletic opportunities he is interested in without worrying 
that his sport will be cut based solely on the gender of the athletes.249  He 
can be confident that PU will continue to provide a competitive hockey 
team that allows him to enjoy his experience, the support of the 
institution, and surrounding community. 
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249 See supra Part I (using a hypothetical situation to introduce the subject of this Note). 
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